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evolved between Israel and Jordan through clandestine negotiations, it wilt 
focus particularly mi die period from the Six Day War of 1967 to the end 
of the Likud administration of 1984. Furthermore, this thesis seeks to 
explain how , while officially at a state of war, Israel and Jordan have 
negotiated on significant matters and have cooperated for their mutual 
benefit. Also, this thesis will analyze this adversarial partnership in terms 
of its cost and benefit to each party. In addition, the paper asserts that 
these negotiations are greatly influenced by the prevailing faction in 
Jerusalem and Amman. The two Israeli factions are comprised of the 
Likud and Labor blocs. Within the Jordanian ruling elite, the two 
opposing groups consist of the minimalists and maximalists. These 
respective factions within their nations strongly influence what is perceived 
as each nation's self-interest. Though this paper is not a study of 
Jordanian or Israeli internal politics. It will also examine the character of 
the negotiations to prove that they reveal the objectives of both Jordan and 
Israel as well as the two opposing factions within each nation.
The thesis divides the post-1967 relationship into four general time 
periods. The first period, from 1967 to the election of the Likud 
government in 1977, can be characterized by intense secret contacts and by 
a high degree of collaboration between high officials of the two states, The 
existence of a Likud government from 1977 to 1984 marks a period where 
negotiations faltered,almost becoming nonexistent.
Aharon Klieman, in Statecraft in the Dark: Israel’s Practice of Quid 
Diplomacy, describes the basic conditions of unwritten and therefore 
undocumented negotiations. The relationship that evolves from such secret
contacts arises in circumstances of "no war, no peace." Kiieman defines
the secret or quiet diplomacy as:
veiled collaboration involving two or more international 
actors pursuing essentially peaceful high policy objectives, 
and which express itself in explicit communications, business­
like exchanges, and tacit understandings of arrangements of 
such sensitivity as to preclude sharing theses confidences with 
either domestic constituencies of other outside parties" (10).
Kiieman further states that an examination of Middle Kustem tacit
alliances reveals that such relationships usually are transitional in nature:
either they will regress into open hostility or further proceed to the open
diplomacy of normalized relations. However, the Jordanian-lsraeli
framework reveals a third possibility where that clandestine partnership
solidifies into a permanent state of relations (2. 94).
The existence of such tacit alliance merits praise because it signifies a
shift from open hostility to covert cooperation. However, secret lies like 
those that exist between Amman and Jerusalem can be criticized because
they often do not resolve the underlying political differences that remain 
nor do they encourage the development of an official, open declaration of 
peace between the parties (2.94).
The benefits of the Jordanian and Israeli tacit partnership have 
accrued over a long period. Israel and Jordan have an enduring history of 
discreet contact which predates the establishment of cither nation as 
sovereign state. This relationship between the Hashemites and the Zionists 
was established in the early days of the British mandate in Palestine. 
Therefore, one of the most salient features of this clandestine collaboration 
is the long-standing and durable relationship which has weathered 
numerous crises. In fact, with the single exception of 1967. Israeli and
Jordanian officials have pursued a policy of de facto disengagement and 
conflict avoidance, illustrating both sides intense desire to avoid future 
armed conflict (Klieman 2,103).
The nature of the coexistence and degree of cooperation between 
Israel and Jordan makes the relationship a unique phenenon in the 
continuing Arab-Isu.eli conflict. The tacit alliance is characterized by a 
series of covert, direct, and indirect contacts which act as binding 
agreements between the two nations. These contacts serve an instrumental 
role in avoiding potential friction along their shared border. Also, the 
direct exchange of information eases concerns that either parties' intentions 
will not be misunderstood. Furthermore, direct communication allows for
clarification of the other parties actions. Moshe Dayan, in his 
autobiography Breakthrough, expressed the importance of mutual 
communications. Even as an avowed critic of the dialogue with Jordan. 
Dayan conceded that the continual discreet contact produced a better 
understanding of "what we could expect form Jordan-or rather, what we 
could not expect" (55). As for King Hussein. SamuelEewis. in a 1987 
edition of Foreign Affairs, claims that "No Arab leader understands as well 
us Hussein the intricacies of Israel's domestic and foreign Middle Eastern 
policy nor has any other spent as much time talking candidly with senior 
Israeli leaders" (601). Although the clandestine exchanges across the 
Jordan have not produced an official peace document, they have brought a 
substantial reduction in tension along the joint border.
Klieman also states that the tacit understanding has nurtured a greater 
sensitivity in Amman and Jerusalem toward their counterparts. This in
turn, has permitted both Jordan and Israel increased freedom in back- 
channel diplomacy. Klieman asserts that given the stability of the
functional collaboration obtained through secret diplomacy, "more 
substance has been achieved de facto by Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom 
of Jordan along the secret back channel than by Israel and Egypt in a 
format state of peace" (2,112).
Another advantage of the atmosphere of cooperation between Israel 
and Jordan is that it has been able to efficiently resolve many of the 
smaller, mundane problems which have arisen. The secret partnership has 
produced concrete results in such areas as the development of Eilat and 
Aqaba as commercial and recreation centers, family reunifications, visits 
by East Bank Palestinians in Israel and promotion of the transfer of Israeli* 
designed and manufactured equipment used in advancing Jordanian
irrigation.
The case of the Israeli-Jordanian tacit alliance demonstrates a 
overriding recognition of affinity of interests. Aharon Klieman argues that 
had both parties base their mutual cooperation on a larger sense of 
complementary needs and corresponding interests. At times, the parallel 
nature of the two states' interests is a function of each nation carrying out
its separate foreign policy, rather than a mutual agreement, l-'or example, 
both Jordan and Israel encourage the United States to play a mediatory role 
in the Middle East peace process in hopes of improving relations with the 
United States and gaining all the benefits that enhanced status provides (2, 
107). At other times, Israel and Jordan find both parties' interests are 
served through secret collaboration thereby establishing a mutual policy. 
The Israeli and Jordanian combined efforts to suppress the establishment of 
a separate, independent Palestinian state illustrates this mutuality of shared 
interests. On other issues, the positions of Israel and Jordan are 
diametrically opposed. Jordan's support for, and occasional leadership in
s
anti-Israeli resolutions in world forum  and die Israeli opposition of 
Iordan's acquisition of sophisticated weapon* exemplify the conflicting 
interests of the two governments (Klieman, 2,107).
David Bar-illan in an August 1988 demonstrates another salient 
advantage of the Israeli-Jordanian clandestine ties: occasionally one state 
has played an intermediary role for the other. For example, Jordan lias 
reportedly mediated talks between Israel and Syria as well as other Arab 
states.
Given the complementary relationship, Israeli and Jordanian contacts 
have often intensified during times of heightened crisis which involved 
political and security issues, such as Jordan's 1970 confrontation and 
violent expulsion of the Palestine Liberation Organization (Pl.O). Also, 
crisis involving shared economic interests like the numerous water 
problems of the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers are often solved through 
continuous negotiations between lower level government officials. 
Furthermore, low-level contacts often take place in an attempt to regularize 
or order the daily affairs along the common border (Klieman 2, 55).
Farid al-Khazen, in "The Middle East in Strategic Retreat," stated that 
although the alliance is unofficial and undocumented, it is only "natural" 
that a degree of rules and assumptions have evolved between the two 
parties. He states that such negotiations need not be formalized before they 
may acquire validity. Al-Khazen further points out four rules that have 
become apparent in his examination of the Israeli-Jordanian functional 
collaboration. The first law is that neither side is asked to relinquish its 
ultimate claims of ideological commitment for the purpose of dialogue. 
Secondly, neither Israel nor Jordan should consciously attempt to press 
extreme demands that the other side could never meet. Also, neither side
should seek to embarrass or compromise the other (i.e. Israel should avoid 
major indiscretions that might expose Hussein to Arab condemnation as a 
traitor). Lastly, each party retains the right to explore and establish 
contacts with other involved actors (1SS).
The clandestine negotiations and working relationship have allowed 
for many benefits as well as numerous risks. The greatest risks that 
touches both Israel and Jordan stems from the apparent success of the back 
channel partnership. This occurs when the two parties make their peace 
without pressing onward to a formalized statement of that peace. Klieman 
notes that at this point, the secret diplomacy functions so well in satisfying 
the essential needs of both governments such as de-escalation, stabilization 
and clarification that it becomes a disincentive against incurring greater 
risks by pushing on to the official peace document. Another possibility that 
exists is that the regimes' leaders who have grown accustomed to the 
discreet understanding may falsely perceive that the relationship is not 
strong enough to produce the final stage of the peace process. Therefore, 
Jerusalem and Amman may accept the present status quo permitting the 
tacit alliance to become converted into something that it was neither 
intended nor designed to be: "a hiding place from decision; a quasi- 
permanent structure" (Klieman. 2. 111).
Historical Perspective 1921 -1948
As noted previously, the tacit alliance between Israel and Jordan has 
had a long history dating back to the British mandate of Palestinc.
Historian Avi Shlaim, in Collusion Across the Jordan.stresscs that the first 
distinct period of collaboration dates from the creation of the Transjordan 
emirate in 1921 to the establishment of the Jewish state in 194X. This stage 
formed the foundations for which all other negotiations rested. These
7foundations were the twin geographical and political 'constants' of close 
physical proximity of shared borders and a common search for security 
and viability through exclusion (or subordination) of the Palestinian 
national movement (2-5).
During this period, Abdullah secretly met with Ben-Gurion and 
Golda Meir in November, 1947 and in May, 1948. They met in an effort 
to exchange information and coordinate their response to the United 
Nations General Assembly's endorsement of the partition of the Palestinian
Mandate. These two meeting did not result in a lasting understanding. 
Instead. Shlaim indicates that the talks revealed that the two sides were
working for diametrically opposed objectives. Jordanian leadership 
wished to gain control of all the West Bank without being forced to accept 
the existence of the Jewish state. While at the same time, the Zionist 
leaders desired to neutralize the Arab Legion without fighting, or if 
possible without conceding the West Bank to Transjordan (Shlaim, 110- 
121). The significance of this period was proven when this stage came to 
an end. The conflict between the two parties in 1948 demonstrated the 
inadequacy of the secret diplomacy.
H istorical Perspective 1948-1951
Like the previous period, this framework revolved around the person 
and politics of King Abdullah of Jordan. In fact, Abdullah's assassination 
on July 20, 1951 drastically altered the covert exchange across the Jordan. 
After cessions of the hostilities in September 1948, Transjordan and Israel 
found themselves copart it ion ists of Palestine. This unique relationship, 
according to Klieman, required that the two states developstrategy aimed 
first at stabilizing and then legitimizing the new status of their territorial 
possessions. Consequently, both states perceived that the only viable means
to achieve their respective goals was through a resumption of talks. The 
first contacts occurred almost immediately after the fighting ended. Unlike
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the previous secret diplomacy, the discussions were conducted with a sense 
of purpose: to arrive ultimately at a bilateral peace treaty. However, the 
respective leaders realized that before such monumental step could be 
taken, there were more immediate pressing problems which needed 
attention. Therefore, the first phases of the negotiations where conducted 
in hopes of agreeing on a interim armistice solution (2, %).
During this time of covert negotiations between Jordan and Israel, 
public truce talks were being held under the auspices of the United Nations 
Truce Supervision Organization. Military officers of the conflicting Arab 
nations and Israel met in Rhodes from 1948 to 1949. Yossi Melman and
Dan Raviv in Behind the Uprising, assert that the formal negotiations were 
a facade for the covert contacts. The true negotiations consisted of a series 
of direct meetings with Abdullah accompanied by his closest advisors and 
Ben-Gurion at Abdullah's winter palace and later in Jerusalem. 'Hie secret 
meeting centered on administering the Rhodes cease fire lines. 
Occasionally, matters of hostile neighborliness such as dealing with the 
theft of farm animals from Israeli settlement or the infiltrations and small
arms fircfights were addressed in these preliminary meetings. During 
these early negotiations it became clear that both sides wanted to avoid an 
externally imposed solution where Jerusalem would be turned into an 
international city (50). Klicman states that the meeting lusted for three 
months and their results were incorporated in the armistice agreement 
signed in Rhodes on April 13, 1949 (2,96).
Having addressed the most pressing difficulties presented by the 
armistice accords, Ben-Gurion and Abdullah began to focus on establishing
a more permanent arrangement (Shlaim, 575-581). They utilized the same 
secret, direct channels as before. The talks continued throughout 
Abdullah's life, but reached a peak between November, 1949 and March, 
1950. These clandestine encounters produced a five year nonaggression 
pact. The final treaty was drafted and even initialed. However, it was 
never consummated because of the reluctance of either Jordan or Israel to 
make compromise further, particularly on the subject of territorial 
concessions. Klieman stated that after this period of intense negotiation, 
this talks proved to be lacking in purpose and substance (2,96).
Historical Perspective 1951-1967
Except for two minor exceptions, the period covering the 
assassination of King Abdullah to the Six Day War was void of vigorous 
clandestine exchanges between Amman and Jerusalem. Aharon Klieman 
noted that this lack of contacts was caused primarily by the instability and 
political upheaval which followed the lose of the central actor, King 
Abdullah (2,97). The bloody assassination of his grandfather outside the 
Ai-Aqba mosque in Jerusalem on July 19,1951, thoroughly convinced the 
young and still insecure King Hussein that direct negotiations should not be 
renewed (Melman, 50). The king not only feared that he was not 
politically strong enough to negotiate any significant breakthrough in the 
peace process, but feared for his life if he was exposed talking with the 
Zionists. This rightly guided fear has continued to strongly influence 
Hussein in his dealings with Israel.
Upon Abdullah's unfortunate demise and the ensuing instability of the 
new regime in Amman, the Israeli leadership also realized that the time 
v/as not right to reaffirm its tacit alliance with the Hashemites. Klieman 
claims that the Israelis realized that it would take many years before the
new monarch could feel sufficiently confident to accept the personal and 
political risk of initiating a direct reproach with Israel. Consequently, the 
reluctance of cither government to extend an invitation to restore the 
clandestine collaboration across the Jordan created a situation where the
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respective policymakers had no other viable alternative but to accept the 
many and obvious imperfections of the status quo (2,97).
Klieman also suggests that both parties accepted the existing state of 
affairs because they viewed the situation as beneficial in achieving their 
national goals. The Hashemite* in particular, saw that the fulfillment of 
their immediate dynastic interests were served by the status quo. The state 
of affairs empowered King Hussein to concentrate on securing his throne 
against opponents inside Jordan as well as within the Arab world. Further, 
the situation allowed Hussein to concentrate on other internal matters,
namely the realization of expanding the kingdom in the West Bank and the 
removal of its Muff-led Palestinian opposition (2, 97).
The status quo also permitted Israel to pursue its national interests 
without the added weight of the secret diplomacy with Jordan. Jerusalem 
during this period sought international recognition of its occupation of the 
West Bank and establishment of a framework for administering the 
occupied territories. Klieman further notes that the lack of any real 
collaboration between the two parties was evidenced in increased border 
incidents and armed reprisals (2, 97).
In sum, the period from King Hussein's accession to the Hashemite 
throne to the open hostilities of the Six Day War was marked by Israeli and 
Jordanian compatibility of interests: each was insecure and defensive.
Also, each was intent on pursuing its own internal objectives of 
consolidating its economic, social and political structure. Paradoxically,
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Israel and Jordan collaborated by not reestablishing their discreet alliance 
but by permitting its clandestine partner to accomplish its separate policy 
objectives. Only matters of minimum possible risk such as the 
preservation of stability along their shared, permeable border invited the 
parties to cooperate (Klieman 2, 98).
The two notable exceptions in the lull in exchange across the Jordan 
occurred after several attempts on King Hussein's life by agents of the 
Arab world. Melman and Raviv state that these assassination attempts
pushed Hussein closer to the Israeli camp. Hussein quickly acknowledged 
that of all the actors in the Middle Hast, the Israelis were the most reliable
and trustworthy: "They might not be his friend, but at least they did not 
appear to be trying to kill him" (56).
Later, the overthrow of the Hashemite Faisal of Iraq in July, 1958, 
prompted King Hussein to extend indirect contacts with Israel. Observing 
that the spreading Nasserist revolution imperiled his throne, the monarch 
sought and gained Israeli permission for Great Britain to activate the 
Anglo-Jordanian defense pact by overflying Israeli airspace in order to aid 
Hussein with arms and troops (Melman, 65).
The first direct contact came from King Hussein's initiative to seek 
Israel’s assistance to improve his image in Washington. Moshe /.ak in 
"Israeli-Jordanian Relations" published in the Winter 1985 volume of the 
Washington Quarterly, states Hussein wished to win support for increased 
American financial and military aid. He met with the special emissary of 
Prime Minister Levy Eshkol, Dr. Yaacov Herzog, in September 1963. In 
the London meeting, Hussein hoped that if an Israeli bucking could not be 
obtained, he could at least convince Jerusalem not to attempt to block 
American aid to Jordan. During the initial negotiations, Hussein explained
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to Herzog that he had deep doubts as to his present ability to finally rid 
himself of the external threat of Nasserism and the internal challenge of the 
Palestinians (168).
Melman and Raviv assert that during the talks, Hussein argued that in 
order to compensate for his weakness, Jordan needed the most modem and 
sophisticated tanks produced: the kind that only the United States could 
provide (71). Zak notes that the Israelis were extremely reluctant to 
support Jordan's acquisition and stationing of modem tanks in the West 
Bank because they were viewed as an immediate threat to Israel's "tight 
hip" in the Tul Karem-Natanya region (168).
The Americans were solicited to pressure Israel to consent to the 
Jordanian tank purchase. Zak states that Acevell Harriman and Robert 
Komer visited Jerusalem to win Israel's acquiesence to the American plan 
to equip two Jordanian brigades with U.S. tanks (168). Klieman reveals 
that with the help of American pressure, Hussein was able to receive 
Israel's tacit consent for the purchase in return for a written pledge that the 
tanks would never be positioned on the West Bank (2,98). Moshe Zak 
states that technically, this promise was kept even during the Six Day War 
when the tanks were placed on the West Bank. He claims that Hussein did 
not break his promise; the order to move the tanks originated from the 
Egyptian general who was stationed in Amman following the military pact 
signed between the king and Nasser on May 30,1967 (169). 
l967-1977_; An_Era of Intense Covert Negotiations and Cooperation
The ten year period from the end of the Six Day War to the Likud 
victory in 1977 was characterized by intense dialogue and cooperation 
between Jerusalem and Amman. The policymakers on both sides of the 
Jordan recognized that their national goals could be best attained through
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tacit collaboration. Political and strategic matters were the main focus of 
the secret negotiations. The economic concerns were placed on the 
backbumer us more immediate issues forced Israel and Jordan concentrate
on crisis management.
Klieman states that the clash between Israel and Jordan during the Six 
Day War resulted largely from King Hussein's "defection" from the 
discreet partnership to his reversal of an "adversarial" role against his 
western neighbor (2, 105). Fortunately, the fighting did not permanently 
sever the secret ties, rather the armed struggle had the odd effect of 
intensifying the dialogue and broadening the tacit cooperation. Klieman 
states that this definite turning point in the alliance can be attributed to the 
war's shock effect on each of the parties. Both nations would have 
preferred to avoid the hostilities through negotiation, yet the confrontation 
forced the two partners to realize the vast inadequacies of the previous 
system and the frailty of the semi-permanent truce (2. 95-106).
The framework that resulted from the heightened awareness of 
mutual objectives and the subsequent contacts allowed for a greater degree 
of flexibility. Klieman suggests that this was evidenced by both parties' 
willingness to "agree to disagree" on the larger political questions such as 
the fate of the occupied territories while exploring possible areas of 
common concern such as stabilizing the shared border via secret dialogue. 
The war also created a sensitivity to the partners' mutual interests of 
avoiding any further armed conflict, administering the West Bank and 
coping with the renewed Palestinian activism us well as improving 
economic ties (2. 107).
In fact, the tacit alliance evolved into a genuine working relationship 
deriving from a common belief that the prevailing relationship, however
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imperfect, nevertheless represented the least possible evils. Mclman and 
Raviv maintain that the secret understanding created an atmosphere where 
Israel and Jordan were "no longer enemies, | rather) they became good 
friends"(96). However, due to the risks which would result from public 
recognition of the concealed contacts, the states preferred that their other 
Middle Eastern neighbors be oblivious to the true facts. The principles of 
discretion and confidentially of back channel diplomacy offered the best 
medium to continue their collaboration.
Initial Contacts
Moshe Zak in "Israeli-Jordanian Negotiations" asserts that the first 
meeting after the Six Day War was held in September 1967 in London.
This meeting took place with Yaacov Herzog acting as an emissary between 
Foreign Minister Abba Kban and King Hussein (1%). This was the initial 
encounter in a series of discussions involving the highest officials from 
each nation. Deputy Prime Minister and later Foreign Minister Yigal 
AI Ion met with Hussein on fourteen different occasions. During the 
decade, Fban saw Hussein twelve times while Yitzhak Rabin met with the 
King on eight occasions. Numerous sources maintain that King Hussein 
held at least seven face to face talks with Israeli prime ministers. Melman 
and Raviv explain that King Hussein, despite his strong desire lor secrecy, 
expanded the circle of Jordanian participants. King Hussein permitted his 
brother and designated successor. Crown Prince llassan to accompany him 
during most of the veiled contacts. Occasionally, the Jordanian monarch 
allowed a few other highly trusted Jordanian officials to become involved 
in the talks when their specialized skills were required (Mclman, 114).
Amman and Jerusalem employed elaborate measures to throw 
probing journalist off their scent. The diversification of remote, highly
secure meeting sites such as the Gulf of Aqaba, the Judean Desert not far 
from Massada, and a secret government guest house on the outskirts of Tel- 
Aviv exemplifies the numerous precautions to insure confidentiality 
(Klieman 2, 99).
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According to Zak. the last concealed negotiations were held in Israel
between Hussein and Labor Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. The covert lies
were cut two months later primarily as a result of the Likud election 
victory changing the government, and with it, the sympathetic stand toward 
the Jordanians (167).
'Hie View from Amman: Minimalists and Maximalists
Throughout the post-1967 period of the covert relationship, 
passionate debates raged in the respective governments over the nature and 
scope of the Israeli-Jordanian tacit alliance. The primary point of 
contention centered around the influence that the respective governments 
hoped to exert in the occupied territories, especially upon the degree of 
collaboration between the two states in administering the West Bank.
In Jordan the two factions that squared off over its ties with Israel 
were known as the minimalists and the maximalists. Klieman. in a 19X1 
article published in the Washington Papers entitled Israel. Jordan. 
Palestine: The Search for a Durable Peace, describes the minimalists' 
position which argued that the West Bank could only be a liability lor 
Jordan. Crown Prince l lassan is considered the main spokesman for the 
group which argued that the costs of enhancing Hashemite prestige through 
cooperative administration of the West Bank with the Israelis could never 
produce substantial benefits. Therefore, this faction advocated for a 
renewed concentration on the East Bank while allowing ties with Jerusalem 
concerning the joint administration of the West Bank to wane (15).
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Historian Ian Lustick in Israel and Jordan: The Implications of an 
Adversarial Partnership states that during the years 1967 to 1977 a second 
opinion held sway in Amman. This maximalist cause championed by King 
Hussein, bases its position on confronting Jordan's three major post-1967 
problems. Hie war had cost Jordan the majority of its most productive 
fertile soil and the holy places of Islam with the loss of the West Bank (5). 
Melman and Raviv state that the second and third aspects of Jordan's crisis 
were intertwined: how to preserve the Hashemite throne when the 
Palestinian population on East Bank had outgrown any other and would 
swell further along with how to cope with the Israeli occupation of the 
West Bank (84). The maximalists felt that through a tacit understanding 
with the Israelis, the Hashemitcs could triumph over their complex 
problems.
According to Melman and Raviv, Hussein also sensed a strong duty to 
rule over a Jordan which spanned both sides of the river. The maximalists 
were further described as being: "deeply pained by the loss of the Temple 
Mount and its mosques in East Jerusalem” (153). They argue further that 
the Hussein's sense of serving as the Islamic guardian for Jerusalem's holy 
sites had a tremendous influence in shaping Jordanian policy toward the 
Jewish state (153). In fact, the two historians state that sentiments, more 
than a rational analysis of the political and economic reality, guided the 
Hashemite policy decisions. They use Hussein's frequent public statement 
of his moral duty to carry out Abdullah's tasks. The hope for a truly 
"Transjordan" Hashemite state was one of Abdullah's goals which Klieman 
notes has endured throughout in Jordanian strategy (I, 19). Therefore, it 
appears that the Hashemites sought the tacit understanding whereby they 
believed that could gain a foothold on the West Bank either through the
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udministration of public services in the occupied territories or through 
negotiation of an exchange of land for peace.
The Israeli Jordanian Option
Israel's Labor party has historically been associated with a policy 
sympathetic toward Jordanian interests. This salient feature was 
highlighted after the Labor party was displaced from the ruling 
government and the subsequent breakdown in cooperation across the 
Jordan. The leading figures of the Labor party perceived the best course 
of action to achieve Israel's overall political, economic and strategic 
objectives was though the "Jordanian Option." Professor Shlomo Avineri. 
the one time Labor Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, 
outlined the main components of this doctrine in two articles in the Fall 
1987 edition of Foreign Affairs and a late 1979 issue of The Natio Me 
justifies the Jewish state's policy of making King Hussein the keystone in its 
Middle Eastern policy of political compromise by placing the problem in a 
wider context than the occupied territories. It is the Israeli perception, 
claims Avineri. that a Palestinian homeland already exists on the east bank 
of the Jordan River. He further claims that Israeli security and political 
issues dictate that that there is no land available between the two states for a 
sovereign Palestinian entity. The establishment of an independent 
Palestinian homeland would quickly degenerate into a PLO terrorist bases 
aimed at inflicting its violent anger at Israel and Jordan (Foreign Affairs.
According to Avineri, the other reason for Labor's insistence on the 
Jordanian option was that Jordan alone can answer the Jewish state's 
overriding security concern. Assuming that an independent Palestinian 
state would be permitted to exist on the West Bank, Avineri states that all
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Israeli policymakers vehemently insisted that it be completely 
demilitarized. However, those looking toward Amman argued that a 
Jordanian-lsraeli collaboration could be better able to insure the
demilitarization of the West Bank than an independent Palestinian state.
The clearest formal expression of Labor-advocated pro-Jordanian 
posture was delivered on July 21, 1974. The official Israeli government 
statement made the following remarks:
•The Israeli government would work for a peace agreement through
negotiations with Jordan:
•The peace would be based on the existence of only two independent states: 
•One of these states would be Israel with a unified Jerusalem as its capital
•'Hie other nation would be a "Jordanian-Palcstinian” state with the
borders which would determined in negotiations between Israel and 
Jordan "east of the Jordan" River;
•In this state, "the specific identity of the Jordanian people would find 
expression in peace";
•Lastly, Israel would continue to regard Jordan as "our natural 
neighboring partner in negotiations for peace on our eastern 
border" (Sinai and Pollack. 135-136).
Following this statement, the Arab Rabat Conference explicitly 
canceled Jordan's claim as the Palestinian representative in buy peace talks 
signifying Arab concent over the Jordunian-lsraeli complementary 
interests on the West Bank.
Like the maximalists in Jordan, the Labor-led Jordanian option met 
with stiff opposition within Jerusalem. The Likud bloc adamantly argued 
against Israeli-Jordanian reproach. They ultimately desired the annexation 
of the West Bank and Gaza Strip into the "Land of Israel." They believed
19
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that any exchange across the Jordan severely hampered their goal. Intra- 
government debate was acerbated during the period of the National Unity 
government of Prime Minister Eshkol. Moshe Zak indicates that the 
dissension within the cabinet was so uncompromising that it often paralyzed 
the government, in fact, Menachem Begin resigned from the National 
Unity government due to his opposition to the covert talks with Jordan 
(169). Zak also reports that throughout Hussein’s diplomatic endeavors 
with Israel, and especially during the Likud government, the Jordanian 
monarch feared that the Israelis would bypass Amman and conduct
separate talks peace talks with Egypt, eliminating Hussein's influence on the 
peace process' direction (174-175). Hussein's fears were latter proven 
correct during the Camp David Accords which were drawn and signed 
without the Jordanian monarch's presence.
As stated previously, the Israeli Labor party and the Jordanian 
maximalists faction held common goals and perceived that those goals 
could be best obtained through a solid, working, yet undisclosed alliance. 
These two groups' positions converged on realization that both Israel's and 
Jordan's political security rested on the shoulders of its neighbor. Klientan 
explains this mutuality of security interests by examining the nature of the 
two states within the Middle Eastern geopolitical framework, l ie points out 
that both Jordan and Israel are small and highly vulnerable. This forces 
both nations to be predominantly defensive and therefore predisposed in 
favor of a status quo in regional politics. To further illustrate his point, 
Klientan states that both nations view themselves as potential victims of 
internal political extremism, Islamic fundamentalism and revolutionary 
Arab nationalism. In sum, the Israeli and Jordanian joint perception of a 
mutual security zone took into account the larger conception of the
strategic state of affairs in which both Jerusalem and Amman would lose 
much from another armed conflict, and that a radical, militant and
expansionist Syria poses a direct danger to the existence to the sovereignty 
of both and that a independent Palestinian state in the occupied territories 
cannot be tolerated (1,16-17).
Israeli intentions have been clearly spelled out in the numerous public 
statements by successive Israeli cabinets which claim that the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of the Hashemite Kingdom on the Past Rank of the 
Jordan River is ”ital to the Jewish State's national interests. Dan Horowitz
in Israel's Concept of Defensible Borders asserts the Jewish political 
leaders view a responsible and moderate regime in Amman as a security 
belt and "defense-in-depth" for Israel on its vulnerable eastern front. He 
also notes that Israel regards the possibility of Jordan's destabilization 
either by attempted coup by forces hostile to the Hashemites or the 
pennanent stationing of foreign Arab troops in Jordan as a direct security 
threat to the Jewish state (10). In light of this risk, Israeli prime ministers 
have continued to announce in no uncertain terms that it reserves the right 
to directly intervene if Jor dan is invaded by foreign forces (Ben-Gurion. 
Address). Horowitz further maintains that Israel's explicit declarations 
hinging its own security on the integrity and sovereignty of Jordan, backed 
up by Israeli's actual military strength has been a powerful deterrent for 
any would-be opponent of Jordan (10).
Israel's announcements have benefited Jordan because they have 
supplied the Hashemites with the power to confront domestic turmoil free 
from outside Arab responses. King Hussein's forcible treatment of the 
Palestinians during the later months of 1970 exemplifies the role that the 
tacit alliance plays in freeing the Jordanian monarch to punish Palestinian
improprieties with relative impunity. According to Melman and Raviv, 
after the huge migration of Palestinians to Jordan following Israel's gaining 
statehood. Hussein's closest aides urged him to "wage an all-out war on the 
Palestinian guerrillas." These advisors feared the existence of the 
Palestinian nationalists was eroding Hashemite authority on the Bast Bank. 
They further warned Hussein early in 1970 that an attempted PLO 
insurrection was imminent. These two writers state that King Hussein was 
"loath" to subject his beloved nation to the horrors of a likely civil war on 
a gamble for a total victory (108-109).
Zak states that Hussein heeded his aides warnings and on February 17. 
1970, secretly contacted Israeli officials through American intermediaries. 
The urgent message, which was conveyed to Foreign Minister Yigal Allen, 
requested precise notification of Israeli intentions if Jordan were to move 
against the Palestinians. Hussein asked whether Israel would not exploit the 
situation for its own advantage if Jordan moved its forces from its western 
border to forcibly act against the Palestinian guerrillas. Further. Hussein 
requested that Israel refrain from reacting to hostile acts directed toward 
the Zionist state by the armed Palestinians. Lastly, the monarch asked for 
Israeli military assistance if Syria or Iraq invaded his kingdom in support 
the Palestinians (169).
Hussein's message touched off another round of heated debate 
between the two factions over the Israeli-Jordanian clandestine dialogue in 
the National Unity Government. Professor Zak states that during the 
ensuing debate, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan held the greatest 
reservations to extending Israeli assistance because, as of February, he did 
not believe that Hussein could survive a fight with the Palestinian 
nationalists. In a rare exhibition of sympathy, Menachem Begin and his
fellow Likud ministers nevertheless acquiesced to the replies sent back 
though the American channels. Zak explained the three replies as follows: 
•Israel would not take advantage of the thinning of forces on the 
Jordanian border by attacking:
•In the case of terrorist activity across the Jordan, Israel reserved the 
right to respond "vigorously;”
•Israel was willing to discuss the question of assistance to Jordan, if the 
"need should ever arise" (170).
Kdgar O'Ballance in "The Jordanian Wars" states that the events of 
early September 1970 broke Hussein's legendary patience, First, the 
September I assassination attempt by the Popular Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine strained the monarch’s resolve against violence. Then the 
hijacking and subsequent explosive destruction of three airliners at Jordan's 
Dawson Field, televised around the globe deeply embarrassed the Jordanian 
king. These events forced Hussein to conclude that his only remaining 
available option was anned retaliation (47). In Melmun and Raviv's 
opinion. Hussein, bolstered by the Israeli pledge of noninterference, felt 
confident enough to launch a massive anned counteroffensive against the 
Palestinians (107).
Lustick points out that during the civil war. the substantial overlap in 
the Zionist and Hashemite interest became apparent when Syrian tanks 
"hastily emblazoned with Palestinian markings" invaded Jordan in support 
of the embattled PLO groups. Hussein was justifiably concerned that the 
nearly 250 Syrian tanks posed a serious threat to the Hashemite dynasty. 
Furthermore. Melman and Raviv assert that the Jordan leader also feared 
that an Iraqi armored brigade based at the strategic Jordanian base of 
Mafrak might join in the fight to assist the Palestinians (109).
An urgent message requesting emergency assistance was sent from 
Amman through Washington. It stated that if the tanks were supported by 
Syrian air protection, the armored invasion would likely bring about a 
collapse of the Hashemite regime. Lustick writes that the Israelis then 
requested that the American Sixth Fleet move toward the area to strengthen 
Israeli's western front. After this request was granted. Israeli Defence 
forces were transferred out of the region in response to the growing 
Jordanian crisis (8).
According to Melman and Raviv, the Jordanians sent an explicit 
message through White House Security Advisor Henry Kissinger that 
Hussein would not object to an Israeli air attack on the Syrian tank 
invasion. However, the king strongly warned that this was not an open 
invitation to send ground forces across the Jordan River. Israel's leaders 
were caught off guard by Hussein's surprise request for an airstrike. They 
found it very peculiar that any sovereign leader would ask a hostile nation 
to bomb his own territory (110).
Arguments raged between the two groups in the Israeli cabinet and 
military establishment who had knowledge of the request. Melman and 
Raviv stated that some of the army officers opposing any assistance to 
Hussein, suggested that if Israel decided to act, it would be in Israel's long­
term interests to help the Palestinians topple the Hashcmitcs (110-111).
However, the anti-Jordanian lobby was countered by those who 
wished to aide their embattled Hashemites partners. Members such as 
Golda Meir. Yigal Alton, Abba Bban and Yitzhak Rabin advocated a plan 
to support the Jordanians. After this faction finally gained the upper hand, 
the Israelis mounted an implied challenge to the Syrians by transferring an 
armored division from southern Israel to the Syrian border near Bel
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She'an. All veils of normal military secrecy were purposely disregarded 
according to the account offered by Melman and Raviv. This was to show 
the Syrians that it would face a formidable tank force if matters in Jordan 
escalated out of control. Furthermore, the Israeli forces in the Golan 
Heights were openly put on highest alert. This potential invasion force, 
barely fifty miles from the Syrian capital, compelled the Syrians to halt its 
advance in order to be able to defend the narrow strip of land between the 
Golan Heights and Damascus. Also, to back up its strategic moves the 
Israeli Prime Minister publicly declared that the Syrian invasion 
endangered the Jewish state’s vital national interests (Melman. 110).
Israel’s response of "flexing...its military muscle" writes Melman and 
Raviv, deterred the possible Iraqi intervention and limited the Syrian 
armored attack (110). I.ustick claims that once these two problems were 
overcome with the assurance of the Jerusalem government, the outcome of 
the hostilities was certain (8). In fact, the Jordanian forces loyal to the 
Hashemites drove the Syrian armored units back across the border in a 
rout. Klieman stated that once freed from the external threat. Hussein was 
able to concentrate his energies upon reasserting Hashemite control over 
the Fast Bank and expelling the Palestinians ( 1,45).
In sum, the Jewish leadership's consent to aid their eastern neighbor, 
according to Luslick. demonstrates the overlap of Israeli and Jordanian 
interests rather than exhibiting American use of Israel as a instrument for 
the United States' foreign policy in the region (X). The result of the 
collaboration of a unified front against hostile Arab action against the 
Hashemite throne in the months following "Black September” strengthened 
the tacit alliance across the Jordan.
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Melman and Raviv in Behind the Uprising describe a series of events 
during the 1973 war which reveals the importance Israel placed on a 
sovereign and viable King Hussein in regard to their broader national 
security interests. During the Yom Kipper War. the Jordanian monarch 
sent Jordanian tanks to the Golan Heights. Hussein's actions against the 
Jewish state could be viewed as a symbolic gesture taken to avoid being 
branded a traitor by the Arab world. In order to achieve their military 
objective, the Israelis had planned an airstrike to bomb the area where the 
tanks were deployed. Melman and Raviv report that by sheer coincidence, 
one of the officers at the front was Zeev Bar-Lavie, head of the Israeli 
Defense Force intelligence branch's "Jordanian Desk." After looking at the 
Jordanian position through binoculars. Bar-Lavie realized that unusual 
activity of the odd crowd of soldiers and vehicles proved that the 
Jordanian monarch was making a front line inspection of his troops. Bar- 
Lavie quickly moved into action to prevent the airstrike. He notified IDF 
intelligence chief HI Zeira and Chief of Staff General David Salazar and 
convinced them that although the Jordanian assembly offered an easy 
target. Israel's long term goals could be better achieved with a living 
rather than a deceased King Hussein. Melman and Raviv note that by 
postponing the attack, once again Israel had saved Hussein's life (121-122). 
Cooperative Administration of the West Bank
The cooperative administration of the West Bank during 1967-1977 
offers one of the most concrete examples of the Israeli-Jordanian tacit 
alliance, liver since the first contacts between Abdullah and the Zionists, 
both parties have felt threatened by the rise of Palestinian nationalism. 
Throughout the enduring history of clandestine negotiations, both Israel 
and Jordan have worked to deny either power of territory with the
Palestinian movement. This common cause was passed down to successive 
generations of leaders on both sides of the Jordan and largely governs their 
outlook toward one another. Aaron Klieman notes that the overriding
security consequences of a Palestinian state have been the major thrust of 
the formation of the tacit alliance. According to Klieman, both nations are 
opposed to political independence for the Palestinians because it would 
entail partitioning geographic, demographic and historical "Palestine" and 
would also include the secession of land from both sides of the Jordan
River (2. 105). The result of these common interests has been that Israel 
and Jordan see each other u.\ a "kindred spirit as well as a source of moral, 
political and diplomatic support" (Klieman 2. I Ob).
'Hie symmetry of interests regarding the West Bank and the 
Palestinians was reflected in the symmetry of stands adopted by the two 
neighbors in response to the repeated calls for the intemationali/ation of 
the divided Jerusalem. As Israeli Ambassador Rafael explains. "During the 
United Nations debates on the status of Jerusalem in 1950 and 1951. we 
kept in close touch with the Jordanian chief representative, T'aw/.i Mulki 
and Toukan | because | the interests in our two countries converged in 
preferring the existing status quo" (qt in Rabinovich. 14).
The greatest incentive for closer contacts between Jerusalem and 
Amman in the post-1967 period was the reemergence of Palestinians, 
particularly the Palestinian Liberation Organization as more independently 
minded and politically active, whose grievances and claims extended to the 
Hashemites and the Israelis. In an effort to counter the renewed Palestinian 
activism, Israeli and Jordanian officials developed a scheme for the 
administration of the territories which could be described as one of shared 
rule involving the Jewish state directly and the Hashemite kingdom
indirectly. Klieman states that the underlying constants of the mutual 
administration of the West Bank Israel's need to have Jordan's support in 
moderating the inevitable stresses of a prolonged military occupation and 
the Jordanian wish for Israeli assistance to act more aggressively in 
expanding its influence throughout the region at the expense of the PLO. 
Both Israel and Jordan viewed the only alternative to an unpleasant yet. 
unavoidable confrontation over the issues of the permanent status of the 
occupied territories and the shape of a lasting peace settlement was a tacit 
alliance maintained through secret diplomatic discussions (2, 107).
The Zionists and Hashemites have effectively utilized the secret 
working arrangement to combat Palestinian terrorism originating from the
West Bank. Lustick asserts that following the Israeli Defense Force’s 
occupation of the West Bank, Fatah and other Palestinian guerilla 
originations attempted to launch a massive campaign of violent resistance 
and civil disobedience in the occupied territories. Yet, as noted previously, 
the two secret services collaborated whereby Jordanian political files were 
mysterious transferred to the Israeli authorities. The cooperation resulted 
in the deportation of nearly one thousand political figures from the West 
Bank and the demolition of hundreds of West Bank residents' homes who
had provided aid to die guerrillas. Lustick further states that by the end of 
1968, both the Israelis and Palestinians knew the cooperation allowed the 
IDF to crush the West Bank-centered resistance movement (7). The 
resistance within the Gaza Strip which began a short time later than that of 
the West Bank, also was brought under control through similar means by 
late 1970. The resistance to Palestinian uprisings continually was at the 
center of the Israeli-Jordanian talks (hiring tire period of 1967-1977.
The two neighbors sought to transform the hostile territories into 
tranquil regions through the restriction and manipulation of the local 
political leadership in favor of moderates who retained close ties to the 
Hashemites in Amman. Israel saw that such a leadership would be a 
calming influence on the often radical atmosphere while the Hashemites 
fa ored the ties as a means to preserve Jordanian influence on the West 
Bank. Lustick claims that the Israelis quickly established close and 
cooperative contacts with the pro-Hashemite patriarchal elites in the 
villages and with the heads of notable families in the towns and cities. The 
Israeli administrators rewarded their efforts to discourage dissent with 
favors such as preferential access to Israeli officials. Lustick notes that the 
policy was relatively successful in that throughout the occupation, the 
traditional power brokers maintained good relations with both the Israeli 
authorities and King Hussein, often shuttling back and forth between 
Amman and Jerusalem to exchange messages and information (9).
Such visible examples of the Jordanian-Israeli tacit alliance reveal the 
contradictory desire of the Hashemite regime following the Six Day War to 
maximize its survival changes while making use of the alliance-induced 
stability to advance the Hashemite interests throughout the Middle Bast, 
particularly in the West Bank, According to Klieman in Israel. Jordan and 
Palestine: The Search of a Durable Peace, the Hashemite claims on the
West Bank rest on three central foundations: geographical proximity and 
an extensive involvement in the history of Palestinian affairs; a profound 
sense of duty toward the Arab world and a moral obligation to the 
Palestinian people; and above alt, self-interest (15).
Lustick states that throughout these years, the liberation of the 
occupied territories remained Jordan's highest foreign policy objective.
Jordan had hoped that through negotiations with Israel it could establish a
loot hold in the West Bank which could be latter translated to regaining 
control of most of the West Bank, especially the Muslim holy places in Hast
Jerusalem (5). Melman and Raviv claim that Hussein’s desire transcended
practical reasons for the reestablishment of Hashemite control of the West 
Bank. Hussein had placed his prestige, authority and self-respect on the 
reunification of Jordan. They also explain that Hussein was willing to
barter peace in exchange for regaining control of his territory. These 
designs were clearly outlined in the Jordanian monarch’s "United Arab
Kingdom" plan of march providing for Hashemite rule over a federation 
between the Hast Bank, West Bank and Gaza Strip. Lustick states that the 
scheme was a reflection of the long standing Greater Hashemite tradition of
his grandfather Abdullah (6).
Klieman points out that Hussein perceived that the West Bank offered 
economic as well as strategic assets that Jordan did not wish to see 
controlled by any other actor, particularly a militant and irredentist PLO 
leadership. For example the loss of the West Bank following the Six Day 
War cost Jordan its most productive agricultural lands. Amman hoped that 
negotiations with the Israeli occupiers would permit the valuable food
supply to continue to flow westward. In addition to the agricultural losses.
the country's tourist industry, previously based on visits made to the 
Muslim and Christian shrines around Jerusalem was nearly crippled after 
1967. The Jordanians wished to recoup some of their losses by providing
safe passage to Muslim holy places in the West Bank negotiated in 
agreements between the two neighbors (Lustick, 5).
The Jordanians were able to establish a strong de facto presence in the
West Bank through cooperation with the Jewish officials. It was
manifested in such tangible economic signs as salaries paid directly to West 
bank civil servants; the retention of the dinar as legal tender for business 
transacted in the occupied territories; the preservation of the pre-1967 
banking system and the flow of investment capital and subsidies from the 
East Bank to the West Bank. Also, Jordan sought to maintain a lasting 
influence with future generations of Palestinians through the use in the 
West Bank of school texts published by the Ministry of Education in 
Amman which were screened for offensive material by Israeli officials. 
Also. Hashemite sway was secured when Israel allowed Jordanian law to be 
enforced on the West Bank (Rabinovich, 16).
The Jordanians not only wished to reap economic and strategic 
rewards through the functional arrangement with Israel over the 
administration of the West Bank but also hoped to ease Jordanian internal 
pressures. Jordan feared that a harsh Zionist rule in the occupied 
territories would force Palestinians to migrate to the East Bank. With over
200,000 new refugees from the 1967 fighting crowding the slums and 
camps of Amman any additional Palestinians would pose a substantial threat 
to Hashemite authority in the capital. Rabinovich explains that later, the 
Palestinian problem was further acerbated from the residual animosity of 
the 1970 war where Hussein became the new arch-villian of Palestinian
movement (). Within a matter of a few months, the so-called "dwarf of 
Amman" had killed more Palestinians than the Israelis had killed since the 
establishment of the Jewish state in 1948. The Jordanians realistically 
perceived that only cooperation with Israeli occupation authorities could 
provide some guarantee that the volatile Palestinians would remain on the 
West Bank.
Relevant to thin point is that following the 1974 Rabat decision 
stripping Hashemite authority to represent the Palestinians, the Amman 
regime was able to counter this explicit rejection of its status and retain its 
presence in the administered territories only through Israel's tacit consent 
and practical cooperation (Klicman 2. 105).
In return for Israeli willingness to allow Jordan to continue its 
presence in the West Hank and Gaza Strip, the Hashemite regime took a 
number of significant measures which made the burden of occupying the 
territories less onerous for the Jewish state. According to Lustick. Israel's 
acquiesence to the preservation of the Jordanian influence can be attributed 
to parallel Israeli policy interests (9). Klicman explains that the only 
question discussed in public debate and within the inner circle of Jewish 
policymakers related to the issue of the extent and on what terms to offer 
in pursuing a compromise with King Hussein over the West Bank. These 
officials were united in the view that Jordan was the lesser of the two
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possible evils ( 1. 34-35). Israel sought to use Jordanian cooperation to 
regularize the most irregular situations of its military occupation of land 
belonging to another country with which it shared many interests.
The ultimate goal pursued throughout this period by the Israelis was 
to retain control of strategic lands in the West Bank without being forced 
to deal with the Palestinian population. For all Israelis this was a matter of 
national security. Dan Horowitz asserts that Israeli decision makers felt 
that the only way to insure Israel's defensible borders was to permanently 
station its armed forces at the Jordan River. They pointed out that the 
United Nations Security Council's November 1967 Resolution 242 could 
not protect the Jewish state's destruction from a concerted Arab attack 
(35). This objective was revealed in the many plans of cooperative
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administration of the West Bank and partition of the region between the 
clandestine partners. Moshc Dayan explicitly outlined the Jewish state's 
policy during talks with the Hashemites: "You don't have to concede one 
inch of your soil, let us have our settlements and military positions 
necessary for our security without giving up land. Call it whatever you 
like foreign presence or not. we are not interested in ruling over your 
people" (ql. in Zak. 172). Dayan later acknowledged that the Jordanian- 
Israeli cooperative administration in the West Bank provided the best 
assurance of suppressing resurgent irredentist Palestinian nationalism in 
West Bank-Cia/u Strip areas (Stale of Israel, February 13, 1979).
In addition. Israeli strategists believed that the implementation of
Hashemite influence on the West Bank would bolster the king's image 
which the Jordanian monarch could use to supplant the Pl.O leadership 
(Rabinovich, 17).
Mclntan and Raviv state that the Israeli position was based on the 
Jewish leadership's desire to pursue a compromise agreement with Jordan 
over the future of the West Bank. Golda Meir calculated that the after the
Israeli tacit aide ensuring Hussein's triumph over the PLO guerilla would 
translate to vast improvements in the clandestine ties, leading to public 
declarations of peace. She supposed that the significant moves that forced 
the Syrian retreat and helped keep Hussein on the throne would leave the 
King with a sense of gratitude (84).
In conjunction with these strategic and political goals, were Israel's 
aim to persuade Hussein to accept a permanent settlement, permitting the 
Jewish military and civilians to remain in the West Bank on religious and 
biblical connections with the land.
After the 1967 war, in discussions amon^ » high ranking officials 
from Jerusalem and Amman both sides attempted to reach an working 
compromise that embodied their respective aspirations for the future of the 
West Bunk and Gaza Strip. Lustick states that even during these secret 
meeting which were often punctuated with sharp words, a certain degree of 
implicit coordination was achieved (6).
However, the Israelis did not always rely solely on the "Jordanian
Option." Melman and Raviv maintain that immediately after the Six Day 
War. Dayan. Allon. and even Prime Minister Kshkol considered bypassing 
Hussein while negotiating directly with the Palestinians. Hshkol went so far 
as to assign a working committee under the direction of David Kimchc. of
Mossad intelligence agents to explore the sentiments of influential West
Bunk and Gaza Arabs. They state that Kimchc and his associates met with 
wealthy merchants, mayors and intellectuals to determine their willingness 
to hold talks regarding the future of the occupied territories (85). Their 
final report to Kshkol's cabinet suggested that the Zionist government could 
take advantage of the "shock of humiliation" among the Arabs and their 
new, close "encounter with the Israelis," by engaging in discussions with 
these Arab leaders (qt in Melman, 85). This report was confirmed by 
military administrators who had been appointed to the territories. Dayan 
sought and won approval for a plan that focused on two local Arab mayors: 
Sheikh Jaabri. mayor of Hebron and Hamadi Kenaan, mayor of Nablus. 
Melman and Raviv point out that this was the first realistic effort where 
Israel pursued a "Palestinian Option" rather than a "Jordan Option" for a 
peace arrangement on their eastern front (85).
Hussein was not obvious to his western neighbor's designs. However. 
Melman and Raviv explain that the king was enraged with Israel's official
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annexation of Hast Jerusalem, after which he was in no hurry to reestablish 
contacts to pursue an immediate settlement with the Jewish state (85). 
Furthermore, Hussein had guessed correctly that the Israeli attempts to 
negotiate with local Palestinians would bare no fruit. The two mayors 
were unwilling to consider any accord that would allow the continued 
presence of Israeli troops in the occupied territories. Plagued with these 
major setbacks, even the Israeli politicians who were opposed to the 
Jordanian Option conceded that there was no realistic Palestinian venue for 
peace (Melman.X7).
In light of no other choice. Prime Minister Hshkol sent several 
messages to Amman through Yaakov Her/.og. Hven though there was a 
brief meeting between Hussein and Her/.og in early July 1967. very little 
was accomplished (Melntan. X6).
The Hashemite king's attitude was altered in November 1967 in 
response to the United Nations Security Council's Resolution 242. After 
the resolution's passage. Hussein publicly welcomed the idea of exchanging 
land for peace. It was against this backdrop that Hussein finally agreed to 
renew his secret dialogue with Israel (Melman. 87).
Israeli internal politics were undergoing significant changes us well. 
The Zionist Labor movement realized its long-time dream forming, in 
January 1968 a united Labor party. This occurred when the Moshe Dayan 
and Shimon Peres' Rafi faction and Ahdut Ha'avasa of Yigal Allon merged 
into a coalition with the mainstream Mapai. According to Melman and 
Raviv, this change affected Israel's relationship with the Hashemite 
Kingdom because the moderate Mapai leadership of Levi Hshkol, Golda 
Meir and Pinhas Sapir were interested in making a deal with Jordan. 
However, this view was countered by pressure from inside the expanded
parly by those like Dayan who put Israel’s security above all other interests 
(92). 'I'he cost of the first unity government of Israeli workers 
representatives was high, diplomatic paralysis.
However, the new leadership later realized that even after the changes 
brought about by Resolution 242, Hussein was not likely to contact them
first. After consultations with his senior ministers. Prime Minister Eshkol
decided to take the initiative and renew the covert dialogue across the 
Jordan. Yaakov Herzog arranged a meeting with Hussein of May 3. I 96X. 
I'he Jewish leadership at the London talks consisted of Foreign Minister 
Eban and Herzog. Menachem Begin threatened to resign if a summit 
between the two head of government were to take place, forcing Hshkol to 
remain in Jerusalem. Begin agreed to Eban’s representation of Israel on 
the strict condition that the foreign minister not be empowered to reach 
any agreement with Hussein (Melman. 87-88).
In Behind the Uprising. Raviv and Mehnan assert that Herzog 
prepared an unsigned secret memorandum tor Eshkol detailing Israel’s 
objectives. Some of the key elements of the note include:
•to assess Hussein’s resolve and ability to conduct separate negotiations with 
Israel, and his willingness to sign a peace treaty absent the support of 
other Arab state;
•to clarify whether the monarch would agree to the demilitarization of the
•to test Hussein’s position on Israel's continued control of a united
Jerusalem:
•to agree that Israel would not change the status of the West Bank’s 
residents without Hussein's consent;
•and finally even before the ratification of a formal peace settlement, begin 
to set up temporary means to prevent terrorism, to encourage quick 
communication in the event of border tensions Hared, and to work
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for mutual economic development (87-88).
As early as 1968, Hussein was accompanied to his London meeting 
with Hban and Herzog by Zeid al-Rafai. During these clandestine contacts. 
Hban presented these objectives in statements where Israeli would return a 
portion of the West Bank to Jordan in return for retaining certain strategic- 
positions. devoid of any population. Hussein had previously learned from 
western diplomats about the internal divisions within the Israeli cabinet.
He questioned Hban on his authority to negotiate on behalf of the entire 
government. Mclman and Raviv report that the foreign minister returned 
a vague reply that related his limitations while insisting on the possibility of
future negotiations. Hussein agreed to such terms insisting on a mutual 
transfer of land, even if the arrangement meant "swapping a mouse for an 
elephant" (qt. in Melman. 92).
Hban Hew home to persuade the Labor government to approve the 
principles outlined in the London talks. The proposal was met by stiff 
resistance from the hawkish ministers, particularly Mcnachem Begin and 
Moshe Dayan who rejected the very first principle Hban had suggested to 
Hussein: that Israel would return most of the West Bank to Jordan.
According to Zak, the ministers reflected the general opinion in post war 
Israel which held that with the additional territorial buffers captured in 
1967, time was on the Jewish state’s side. They therefore refused to see the 
urgency in agreeing to a separate peace settlement with Jordan, especially 
with regard to these strategic lands (173).
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Though (he Jerusalem government could not reach a consensus on the 
exact nature of the talks' objectives, all factions felt that it was still in 
Israel's best interests to continue the clandestine dialogue. Melman and 
Raviv note that this was evidenced at the end of September 1968, when a 
three man team comprised of Eban, Alton and Herzog engaged in talks 
with Hussein and al-Rifai. They state that during this second London 
exchange, Alton proposed his famous Allon Plan which set the River 
Jordan along with a line cutting through the Dead Sea as the borderline 
between Israel and the Kingdom of Jordan (93). TTiis proposal also 
contained provisions whereby a "strip of land between 10 and 15 
kilometers wide, the length of the Jordan Valley up to the Dead Sea. should 
be connected to Israel itself. Nortl. of the Dead Sea. the border should run
toward the West, so as to avoid Jericho and extend to the northern 
boundary of Jerusalem so as to include the highway from Jerusalem to the
Dead Sea within Israel" (qt. in Melman. 94).
Alton's carefully crafted border exemplified Israel's enduring hopes 
of gaining strategic without the Palestinian population. The foreign
minister in submitting the Allon Plan to the Israeli cabinet on July 27.
1967, estimated that the expanded territory of the Jewish state would
incorporate only an additional 15.(100 Palestinian Arabs. Allon did not 
include in this figure the tens of thousands in the already annexed East 
Jerusalem (Melman, 94). In addition, it would appear '.hat Alton hoped his 
scheme to include a strip along the river in Israeli sovereign territory 
would provide essential security while preserving the vital Jewish majority 
in the Land of Israel. These concessions were to also function as
inducements to Jordan to keep the peace process going.
The .Hashemite ruler refused to consider Alton's proposition. 
According to Melman and Raviv, the king had insisted that he had returned 
to London specifically to hear partner's replies to the plans drawn up 
previously with I-ban and A lion, including mutual exchange of territories 
to modify the pre-1%7 borders. Hussein felt that he was being forced to 
listen to an entirely different plan. ’Hie king responded, demanding that he 
no longer wanted seventy percent of his lost land returned as previously 
agreed, rather he required that the entire West Bank and Last Jerusalem be 
handed back to the Hashemite Kingdom. This demand completely ignored 
Israel's annexation of the Old City (93).
Melman and Raviv write that Hussein and Rafi returned to Amman
disappointed that their primary aim. the recovery of all of the West Bank 
and Hast Jerusalem, was gradually slipping from their grasp (95).
Hussein's attention would be diverted as the Palestinians used this period to 
build their own power centers which felt no loyalty the Hashemite throne.
The Israeli contingent reported back to the cabinet regarding 
Hussein's complete rejection of the Allon Plan’s principle of territorial
compromise. However. Melman and Raviv note that the three did not paint 
totally disheartening pictures: they suggested that the king's disapproval 
was not final and immutable (95-96).
The London meeting during the late months of I96X are especially 
important because they reflected what became typical of the secret contacts 
between Jordan and Israel. Lor the Israelis the meeting taught them very 
valuables lesson that though Hussein was willing to negotiate in private, his 
fear of Arab reprisals of an open agreement severely limited his bargaining 
power. In addition, the Jewish leadership realized that the Hashemite king 
could always resort to demanding the return of all captured territories
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when he sensed he was being backed into a comer. Lastly, they began to 
contemplate whether the true road to peace ran through Cario and not 
Amman.
'Hie 1968 meeting demonstrated to Hussein that the Israelis were 
strong and confident after their victory, and therefore unwilling to 
realistically sacrifice large portions of thei • newly won booty. The talks 
also provided Hussein with a degree of underslanuing and appreciation for 
the inner workings of the Israeli political struggles. The monarch used this 
knowledge to estimate the degree of Israeli flexibility toward their eastern 
neighbor. Given the division which split the united Labor government, not 
to mention the numerous divergent factions that comprised the Israeli 
political scene. Hussein quickly recognized that a territorial compromise 
was difficult for the Jewish state to accept, yet without wider Arab backing, 
the monarch had to demand every kilometer of his lost territory (Klicman
•  w
I .  23).
When Prime Minister Lshkol died in Jerusalem in February 1969. 
Israeli internal politics were transformed, affecting the tacit alliance across 
the Jordan. During the subsequent Golda Meir administration. Moshe
Davan increased his influence over the direction of the Israeli-Jordanian0
dialogue. Melman and Raviv state that Dayan had always been "fervently 
attached to the ’Land of Israel" and believed that the Jewish state had every 
right to build settlements on the land captured in the Six Day War. They 
also assert that Dayan was less than enthusiastic about Hussein’s leadership
( 101- 102) .
Alter reaching the post ol defense minister in the Meir government. 
Dayan asserted these beliefs along with his opinion that a diplomatic 
solution based on territorial compromise with Jordan would not be
/beneficial for his nation. He proposed an alternative to the Alton Plan 
which became known as "functional compromise." The functional 
compromise would better serve Israel by agreeing with Amman on a 
division of responsibilities in the territories rather than returning parts of 
the lands to Jordan sovereignty. Dayan called for the Jewish state to be 
responsible for the territories’ defense and protection of the new 
settlements. The Hashemite role under the plan was to manage the day-to- 
day lives of the Arab majority. The plan was to entice the Jordanian 
monarch by permitting him to once again rule over the West Bank's 
commerce, education, health and legal affairs (Melman. 96).
Dayan's proposal was similar to the Alton Plan in that both wished to 
meet Israel's long-standing desire of defensible borders without being 
forced to deal with the Palestinian populace. Both schemes wished 
Jordanian influence in the West Bank to quell the inevitable Palestinian 
resistance. It would also seem that both Israeli statesmen formulated an 
Hashemite presence in the territories to legitimize the protracted 
occupation. The two plans diverted in similarity in their design to 
accomplish this complex task (Melman, %).
Dayan attempted to convince Hussein of the merits of his plan during 
September 1970 exchanges. The talks, according to /.ak. included the 
isracli delegation, headed by Prime Minister Meir and the usual Jordanian 
team, consisting of Hussein and his closest advisors. The proposals 
presented by the Israelis, reflecting the new strategy included the following 
principles:
•local pro-Hashemite authority would be established in Gaza while allowing
for Jordanian administration to be set up over most of the West Bank;
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•Jordan would retain special rights to oversee Muslim holy places in Hast 
Jerusalem, including the right to appoint the Supreme Muslim Council 
whose authority extended over the mosques of the Temple Mount 
•in order to maintain adequate control over Gaza, Israel would permit 
Jordan to station its army and police forces in the Strip.
•Gaza residents would receive Jordanian citizenship;
•lastly. Israel promised to seek international financing to build new housing 
for the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza (Xak, IIV).
Moshe Xak in the Winter 1985 edition of the Washington Quarterly, 
claims that the Israelis sought in return for the concessions Jordanian 
acceptance to proposals that would allow Israeli bases to remain in the West 
Bank, providing that they did not interfere with civilian life. Hurthcr the 
scheme allowed Jewish settlers to build homes in the West Bank. Jerusalem
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promised that such settlements would not expel any Arabs. Xak states that 
although the plan does address significant issues, it left open important 
questions like the permanent status of Jerusalem ( IIV).
Mclman and Raviv state that the Prime Minister viewed the proposal
to be mutually beneficial to the secret partners. I'he> conclude that Men
believed that upon the agreement of the plan, the Jordanians would sign a 
peace treaty an would establish open diplomatic relations. Meir also felt 
that the s'ationing of Israeli troops in the West Bank would alleviate some
of the Jewish state's security concerns (I IV).
Meir’s perceived the new proposal to benefit both clandestine partner 
and according to Mciniun and Raviv, was shocked by the Jordanian 
response that it was not willing to consider any permanent settlement that 
included anything less than a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces and the 
return of the West Bank to Hashemite control (120). Moshe Xak explains
that Hussein raised the question of a partial settlement or an interim 
agreement which would consist of special guarantees such as demilitarized 
zones and even minor adjustments, to help his western neighbor feel more 
secure (119). All three historians concur that Hussein demanded that any 
Jordanian concessions would be met with a mutual exchange of territory.
The Israeli countered with ;*n offer similar to the Alton Plan, but the 
king rejected this new proposal categorically (Zak, 172). In sum, Hussein 
was willing to discuss everything, including the character of Jerusalem. 
However, the king made it clear that his willingness to reach an all- 
encompassing agreement was based on his insistence of intemationale 
borders which would be almost exactly follow those before the Six Day 
War.
Melman And Raviv note that having been thwarted in his negotiations 
with his Jewish partner. Hussein ptaced a new plan out into the 
international forum. The authors insist that the Hashemite scheme which 
called for a federal plan to be based on a united Arab kingdom in two parts 
had "great propaganda value but little practical effect" (120). In Hussein’s 
March 1972 plan, the western sector would be "Palestine" incorporating 
the West Bank and any other part of pre-Israel Palestine that could be 
liberated. The eastern portion of the united kingdom would be comprised 
of post-1967 Jordan (Melman, 120). The Jordanian monarch appeared to 
demonstrate his loyalty to the Palestinians while giving the Israelis a strong 
indication of his dissatisfaction with prior talks. Also the federal plan, 
writes Raviv and Melman, contained a message to Israel, the Arabs and the 
international community that Jordan was to remain a dominant actor in the 
West Bank and that the king had no intentions of surrendering his authority 
to represent the Palestinians who lived there (121).
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Melman and Raviv assert that Rabin rejected both Jordanian plans. 
Instead, Shimon Peres in discussions in the Avava dessert, suggested
another cooperative administrative plan where the covert partners would 
collaborate in governing the West Bank. After the king summarily 
rejected this proposal, Allon offered a similar idea put forward by Golda 
Meir earlier. The foreign minister proposed that Israel allow Jordan set up 
a civil administration in a smaller part of the Jordan Valley, specifying that
Jericho function as the headquarters for the Jordanian administrator (130). 
Hussein was intrigued by the possibility of regaining even a small portion 
of the West Bank. As the 1974 talks concluded. Hussein simply stated that
he would think about Allon‘s proposal and return his considered response 
at the next session.
Hussein returned Amman and turned his attention to another pressing 
matter, the upcoming Arab Summit in Rabat Morocco whose agenda was 
topped by the Palestinian issue. Melman and Raviv state that analysts in 
Jerusalem concluded that the summit would explicitly remove Jordan's 
right to speak on behalf of the Palestinians. In the subsequent debate that 
followed, two groups developed. Allon led the first camp which insisted 
on the Jordanian Option and demanded that the government intensify its
efforts to reach an agreement with Jordan The second faction anchored by 
Rabin and Peres' leadership stressed another allcmativ * to the Jordan
Option. They culled for an Egyptian-oriented policy which would build on 
the earlier separation of forces along the Suez Canal ( 130-131).
Hussein realized that the clouds over the alliance were growing 
darker as the Israeli cabinet began to lean toward Cario to obtain a peace 
settlement. Yet, it appears that the Rabat summit confirmed this shift and
destroyed any realistic chance to solve the Palestinian issue before the 1977 
Likud victory.
The Rabat decision "to confirm the right of the Palestinians people to 
establish a national, independent authority on any Palestinian soil which 
shall be liberated under the leadership of the PLO, which is the sole legal 
representative of the Palestinian people" sent Hussein to believe that his 
friends had betrayed him, according to Melman and Raviv. He refused to 
met with Israeli officials and demonstrated his frustration over the whole
Palestinian problem, declared that Jordan no longer felt the duty to be 
responsible for Palestinians living under Israeli occupation (Melman.132).
Moshe Zak states that only after sensing the situation was slipping 
entirely from his control. Hussein agreed to met with his Jewish 
counterparts. The Hashemite leader voiced his strong displeasure with the 
apparent lack of Israeli support on the eve of the Rabat Conference: "We 
are out of the picture, please talk to the PI.O and then we will see" <qt. in 
Zak, 173).
Hussein quickly realized that he was also losing his position in the 
discussion of the Middle Last peace negotiations. On May 2X. 1975, in a 
meeting with Rabin. Peres, and Allon, Hussein expressed his concern about 
another interim accord Israel was preparing to sign with Lgypt (Melman. 
132). Throughout Hussein's reign, the king was constantly worried about 
being kept out of the diplomatic picture. These last contacts could be 
viewed as the liashemiles' last ditch effort to avoid this isolation.
Zak notes that Hussein had every reason to keep up the dialogue. 
President Ford had just declared a Middle East policy reassessment 
implying an American move toward Israeli-Jordanian negotiations. 
Melman also explains that Jordan was not entirely out of the picture and
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had not resolved to be placed on the margins of the peace settlement. 
Jordan hoped that the clandestine talks would enable the Hashemites to
prevent a separate peace between Israel and Egypt which would decide the 
fate of the West Bank without regard to Jordan's interests.
High level negotiations continued after the interim agreement was 
signed by Israel and Egypt in Geneva in September 1975 on the West Bank 
even though Hussein lacked formal authority to act on behalf of the 
Palestinians. During these sessions, which lasted until March 1977, new 
proposals where offered but nothing substantial was accomplished.
Mclman and Raviv state that the importance of these meeting was simply 
their existence ( 123). The gap in policy interests was to allow for a 
settlement over the West Bank. Zak elaborates on these opposing positions: 
Hussein wanted to regain every inch of his land and the Israelis were 
unwilling to even consider returning to the thin and unsafe borders of their 
state's birth (173).
As elections were being held in Israel, both partners decided to met 
after the new government was formed to discuss the future of the occupied 
territories. These talks did not materialize as the May elections toppled toe 
Rabin government, bringing Menachem Begin into power.
Mutual Security Interests
Another example of the commonality of perceived interests was 
illustrated by the Israeli-Jordanian cooperation in securing the permeable 
border against hostile border attacks by armed Palestinian guerrillas. 
Mclman and Raviv note that Israel has always been highly sensitive to such 
armed incursions and were deeply concerned following the lute 1970 
Palestinian ejection. Following the Palestinian expulsion, the Israeli 
leadership questioned Jordan's ability and resolve to stop the Palestinian
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guerrilla organizations from returning to their bases along the border.
They feared based on the eastern bank if the Jordan, the Palestinians would 
launch terrorist attacks against Israeli cities and Jewish settlements on the 
West Bank. King Hussein shared a similar interest in eliminating the 
terrorist activity originating from his border (134).
Melman and Raviv reveal elaborate cooperative measures taken by the 
two states to strengthen their fight against Palestinian terrorism. It was 
reported that the intelligence agencies of the two countries reinforced their 
coveil ties by installing direct telex and telephone lines between the 
Jordanian intelligence service in Amman and Mossad stationed in 'Pel Aviv 
(134). Also included in the heightened collaboration were the direct 
exchange of information between the two services when Israeli intelligence 
officers traveled to Amman. In fact, Jordanian intelligence files on 
Palestinian nationalists mysteriously fell into the Israeli intelligence 
service’s hands through the veiled efforts of their Jordanian counterparts 
following establishment of the occupation after the Six Day War (Klieman.
During this period between l%7 and 1977, the best illustration of the 
Israeli-Jordanian working understanding in opposing Palestinian terrorist 
actions across the Jordan River came in response to a massive Israeli 
armored and infantry raid on March 21, i 968. The raid, which was also 
supported by the Israeli air force, crossed the Jordan and proceeded to 
open fire against the Palestinian-controlled village of Karcmeh. The 
Israelis sought to punish the Palestinians foresealuting the border attacks. 
Melman and Raviv maintain that even though the headquarters of the 
Palestinian organization was completely destroyed, this large raid was 
deemed an embarrassing setback for the Israeli army. During its retreat
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back across the Jordan, the Israelis were attacked by Jordanian forces and 
suffered large losses; thirty Israeli soldiers were killed and another eighty 
were wounded as Jordan's Arab Legion countered the Israel raid with an 
impressive fight ( 1(H)).
Israel’s Chief of Stall', General Chaim Bar Lev was outraged, lie 
accused Jordan of aiding the Palestinian fighters by purposely permitting 
them to cross the border with impunity. Klieman further stated that the 
general sent a message to Hussein explaining that Israel did not intend to 
erode or threaten the Hashemite throne by reprisals directed at the 
Palestinians located on Jordanian soil. However, having no other option 
available. Bar Lev asserted that Israel was acting in its own legitimate self 
defense (I. 102-103).
The Hashcmites warned Jerusalem that the two partners were on the 
verge of open warfare and used thei- back channels to request a meeting 
with their Israeli counterparts. The subsequent encounter took place in 
London between Hussein and Bar-Lev. Hussein pointed out that presently, 
he was engaged in open clash with the Palestinian guerrillas and was taking 
all possible steps to prevent further armed incursions into Israel. Melman 
and Raviv state that Bar-Lev replied that if Hussein could not halt the 
attacks, then Israel would be forced to continue its retaliatory raids (101). 
During the London talks detailed by Melman and Raviv. serious 
negotiations on the larger issues involving a diplomatic compromise were 
nonexistent. These long-term issues were instead replaced by crisis 
management focusing on dealing with the hostilities across the border 
( 102) .
Necessary follow-up discussions were conducted in the Gulf of Aqaba 
in March 1970 between the highest officials from birth sides. Dayan, who
49
dominated the talks, arrived at a unique solution. The foreign minister 
proposed a plan whereby the Israeli army would withdraw from two 
villages east of the Jordan. These two towns, al-Safi and Fifi, were 
captured a few months earlier in punitive attacks against Palestinian 
guerrillas. Melman and Raviv assert that the Israelis seized these particular 
villages after Palestine Liberation troops loyal to Arafat fired Russian- 
made Katayush rockets directed at the nearby Dead Sea Works, the Israeli 
chemical factory. They also mention that the Israelis appeared to have 
every intentions of staying; the Israeli army had even paved a road across 
the border to it (106). Klieman states that if the Israeli forces were 
withdrawn from the area. Hussein and his chief of Staff, General Shaker, 
promised to restore order not only in al-Safi and Fifi area, but along the 
entire border. The Jordanian leaders paid particular attention to reassuring 
the Israelis that they would concentrate their efforts in the Arava Valley 
and the territory between Filat and Aqaba which had experienced heavy 
Palestinian attacks (2, 103).
Later on in March, the Israeli defense force (IDF) evacuated the two 
towns in response to the joint agreement with Hussein whereby Jordanian 
forces would replace the retreating Israeli army,preventing the region 
from being used as a base for terrorist activity in the future (Melman.
107).
Zak notes that although the withdrawal of IDF troops was derived 
through negotiation, Hussein attempted to claim that he had personally 
directed the Jordanian attack which successfully ousted the Israeli military 
from al-Safi and Fifi. Zak also reported that many Israeli officials, who 
were privy to the plan, were understandably taken aback. Dayan however, 
convinced them not to challenge Hussein's boasting, declaring, "If the King
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of Jordan actually decides to take things into his own hands and order his 
forces to clear the area of terrorist, it should be seen with favor. If he 
succeeds, the IDF will have no reason to cross the cease-fire lines...” (qt in 
Melman, 107).
Melman and Raviv concur that after gaining control of the two towns 
and surrounding areas, the Jordanians kept their promise. Jordan's Arab 
Legion quieted the entire 125 mile section of the border from the Dead Sea 
through the Arava Valley to the Gulf of Eilat. They note however, that 
Jordan was unable to stop guerrilla attacks on the West Bank and northern
Israel. In fact, the Israeli self-restraint was seriously tested as the severity
of the attacks worsened (107).
During this period Israeli and Jordanian officials not only worked 
toward limiting hostility over the armed incursions, but cooperated in 
solving the potentially dangerous problem of defining the shared border. 
The collaboration was exemplified during a 1975 meeting, where King
Hussein voiced concern over border rectification in the Arava region. Zak
states that the problem had arisen after a team of Japanese surveyors, 
planning a new road to Aqaba, discovered that the border had been 
mistakenly moved several kilometers to the east. At the King's request. 
Rabin and other Israeli leaders examined the area and the documents.
concluding that the Jordanians were correct. The prime minister informed' 
the king that the mistake would be rectified, returning to Jordan a small 
parcel of land (173).
Common Ties MihJhe Unified States
Lastly, the Jordanian-lsraeli tacit alliance was promoted and 
strengthened by their common ties through the United States. The 
American government proved to be instrumental in the operation of covert
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contacts following the Six Day War. Melman and Raviv assert that this 
unique relationship between the two countries began when Israel and 
Jordan separately confided in the top echelons of the Johnson 
Administration. Through these contacts the United States became privy to 
the secret negotiations which were taking place between Amman and 
Jerusalem. In fact, they note that Hussein had suggested in 1968, that a 
secret report be sent to President Johnson regarding the status of the recent 
clandestine exchanges (103).
The tw covert partners began to rely so heavily on the American 
communications channel that they almost completely stopped using their 
previous British contacts. Klieman states that because both countries arc 
viewed as pro-western and are dependent of American economic and 
military aid, it is only natural that they would look favorably on a more 
active American role in their secret contacts (2,106). Melman and Raviv 
give similar reason why the two countries would prefer the United States as 
an intermediary. The United States officials changed the venue for the 
covert exchanges from the Europe to the Middle East. Hussein approved 
this change because it provided some reassurance in light of the monarch's 
reluctance to leave his country, increasing the possibility of unrest during 
his absence (104).
Another advantage of the American involvement was demonstrated 
later when most contacts between Amman and Jt nsalem were arranged 
through United States intermediaries, allowing each party to take advantage 
of the powerful American communications technology. The United Stales 
had installed computerized communication systems by the early 1970's 
between the two officially hostile capitals in order to facilitate cooperation. 
With the aid of American technology, the leadership of the two states could
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directly contact each other via scrambled telephones and telexes, which 
according to an April 24. 1986 Jerusalem Post article entitled "The King 
and his Riddles." were linked to encoding devices for both oral and written 
communications.
Secrecy was always a major concern for both sides especially 
regarding these communications. The Israelis limited access to only the 
highest members of the government, while Hussein's extreme paranoia 
permitted only his closest advisors to even know or the system's existence 
(Melman, 105).
Another advantage the two parties quickly recognized was American 
intermediaries were efficient in setting up a clandestine contacts. Melman 
and Raviv write that after learning that either side wished to met. it would 
typically take the United States ambassadors stationed in the Middle Kastcrn 
capitals no more than two or three days to arrange a meeting (105).
Zak states that first such meeting arranged through American 
channels was aboard an Israeli missile boat in the middle of the Gulf of
Eilat. The March 1970 meeting's participants were Moshc Dayan. Abba 
Eban, Chaim Bar-Lev and Yaakov Herzog along with King Hussein and 
General Zeid ibn-Shaker (105).
Both the Jordanian and Israeli policymakers continued to direct their 
negotiations through the Americans because it served their nations' 
interests to be able to call on United States assistance when needed. This 
was clearly illustrated during this period during the September 1970 
Palestinian crisis in Jordan. Hussein directed all of his questions through 
Washington to Jerusalem because he not only sought Israeli assistance, but 
also wished to inform the Americans of his dire situation, requesting an 
American guarantee to protect his throne (Zak, 170).
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Economic Benefits of the Tacit Alliance
Although political and security issues dominated the secret contacts 
during the ten year between 1967 and 1977, there where significant 
negotiations involving economic matters. Typically, during the covert 
negotiations, the top echelons of both governments concerned themselves 
with the most pressing issues of their mutual security and strategic 
interests. Occasionally, during this period, general outlines for economic 
cooperation were agreed upon and then delegated to subordinates to work 
out the specific details (Klieman 2,104).
Yossi Me I man and Dan Raviv claims that both the Hashemitcs and the
Israelis originally intended that economic development would further 
enhance the general understanding between the partners. They also state
that the policymakers in Jerusalem and Amman based their call for 
cooperation on their common assessment that both countries had similar
economic needs and natural resources. These shared resources included
the Dead Sea, blessed with great mineral wealth and the valuable waters of 
the Jordan River. Furthermore, both hoped to develop an economically
viable method to exploit the shale oil in the Arava and Negev deserts, and
each have a common commercial interest in the future of the Gulf of liilai-
Aqaba. Therefore, Melman and Raviv state that is only "natural" that 
Israel and Jordan have worked to jointly develop these resources ( 179- 
1X0).
Melman and Raviv acknowledge that one of the first instance where 
economic issues were discussed between the top Israeli and Jordanian 
policy makers was during a secret 1971 meeting between Ambassador 
Yit/.hak Rabin and Crown Prince Hassan, the Hashemite minister for 
economic development and housing. The exchange centered on cooperative
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means to develop the Jordanian River Valley. Prince Hassan was
particularly interested in gaining up front, an Israeli guarantee that the 
Jewish state would not interfere in with the Jordanian development on the 
river's edge. He also sought to obtain Israeli specialized knowledge in 
construction and irrigation as well as its insight in raising funds through 
the international finance markets (179).
In a May 1973 meeting, Chaim Givati, Israel's Minister of 
Agriculture and Development, Mordecai Gazit Director-General of the 
Agriculture Ministry and Ephraim Shila, director of Farm Planing in the 
Ministry of Agriculture, met with Hassan and Jordanian Prime Minister
Ritai. The leaders again discussed in detail, the Hashemite plans for
developing the river valley, including Hassan's request that Israel assist in 
building home for Palestinian refugees, many who had been forced to leave 
their homes on the East Bank during the civil war. Melman and Raviv note 
that Givati sympathized with the Jordanians but responded that his nation
was not wealthy enough to contribute financially. However, Givati did 
pledge to assist by providing essential advice stating: "We arc prepared to 
give you all the knowledge we have." The Israeli Minister of Agriculture 
then suggested that Jordan send its farming experts across the Jordan to 
learn modem farming and irrigation techniques (181).
One of the most significant economic benefits that has resulted from
the tacit alliance was cooperation over their common water resources. In 
this arid region,prosperity and productivity depend on access to the 
precious commodity of water, making water rights one of the most bitterly 
contested issues. The collaboration centers around the Yarrnuk River
which runs from Syria through Jordan and the tiny Dan River located in 
Israel and the vital River Jordan. Melman and Raviv note that both sides
realize how important these rivers are to their neighbor and have taken 
care, even during the worst diplomatic times, to settle water disputes as 
rapidly as possible. The disputes were usually resolved though direct face- 
to-face negotiations between Israeli and Jordanian technical experts through 
the arrangements made by U.S. officials (184).
The agreement over water rights is based upon the American- 
proposed Johnston Plan which dates back to the early 1950's. Though the 
plan was officially vetoed by the Arab league in 1954, its tenants form the 
foundations for the distribution of the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers.
Another benefit of the covert economic cooperation is the peaceful 
agricultural production pursued on both sides of the Jordan Valley.
Mclman and Raviv state that after the formation of the Jewish state, these
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fertile lands were largely ignored because the Jordanian owners constantly 
feared the threat of reprisal raids by the Israelis. The valley was 
transformed from a green cultivated area to a barren waste land devoid of 
agricultural output. This fear combined with the artillery fire and air raids 
in response to Palestinian guerilla attacks on Israel, were a tremendous 
disincentive for any type of agricultural development as the Jordan River 
Valley (117).
The Jordanians had hoped to restore the Bast Bank's agriculture 
production in an effort to compensate for the loss of the West Bank's 
output after 1967. The defeat and expulsion of the PLO gave the 
Hashemite regime the needed confidence and control to begin to achieve 
this goal. In 1973, Amman announced its first development plan aimed at 
encouraging farmers and other Jordanians to return to the Bast Bank to 
begin farming and other agricultural enterprises. In Melman and Raviv's 
opinion, the Hashemites clearly recognized that any efforts ’o develop the
land required an Israeli pledge not to destroy the efforts by a continuation 
of the past attacks. Throughout that same year, the Jordanian monarch and 
the Israeli prime minster, Golda Meir, held talks resulting in an 
understanding making it possible for the farmers on both sides of the 
Jordan to return to the land. They note that like most of the secret 
economic agreements between the states, the precise details of the program 
were latter arranged by lower officials. Both nations strove to induce a 
period of calm along the river valley border, allowing the cultivation right 
up to the edge of the water. After the subsequent decline in tensions, 
farmers on both sides began to benefit from the hundreds of additional 
arable acres which the military had returned for agriculture (117-120).
Later, Mclman and Raviv state that the cooperation across the river 
became well established and regulated. This -,vas demonstrated when 
villagers and farmers on both banks of the river complained that the 
mosquitoes, growing in the river had become an intolerable nuisance. 
Representatives from Amman and Jerusalem met on the riverbank and 
surveyed the mosquito situation. Their joint solution involved massive 
spraying of poisons on the mosquitoes and their hatching grounds from 
both sides of the river. The sprayings were conducted by light aircraft; 
Jordanian pilots worked on the East bank while their counterparts from the 
Israeli Chemavir concentrating on the West Bank. The two historians 
quote an senior Israeli official who stated that the collaboration from 1967 
to 1977 between the secret partners ranged "from anti-mosquito to ant- 
terrorist tactics" (117-118).
Also, Jordan and Israel felt that the hidden cooperation would be 
beneficial to both parties if it was extended to aviation in the area. After a 
number of joint contacts between aviation officials, Israel and Jordan were
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able to agree on procedures to greatly reduce the danger of midair 
collusions between aircraft operating out of the perilously c'ose airports of 
Eilat and Aqaba. One important safety aspect was that the control towers 
of the two facilities would monitor each other's frequencies, listening for 
any potential accidents (Melman, 13S).
There were some commercial negotiations which were unable to 
transcend the regional hostilities to produce mutually advantageous results. 
Klieman reports one occurrence where cooperation on the development of 
a chemical plant was smothered by the 1973 war. In a May, 1973 meeting.
Crown Prince llassan notified Chaim Givati that the Jordanians were
planning to build a new potash plant on the Dead Sea. However, 
difficulties had developed. Hassan therefore asked for Israeli assistance 
learned from the construction and operation of their own potash plant, the 
Dead Sea Works. Klieman states that after various plans were proposed 
and summa.ily rejected, Israeli officials agreed to be secret partners in the 
Jordanian factory. The factory was to produce potassium-based chemical 
products for export to be used in industry and agriculture. In return, the 
Israelis promised to utilize their connections with Americans and West 
Europeans to raise funds for the plant's construction. The two parties 
agreed to meet again to formalize the partnership on Sunday October"
1973. Unfortunately, the Yom Kipper War broke out and the meeting was 
never held, destroying the plan ( I, >j-27). Melman and Raviv claim that 
after the war, business contacts between the two capitals concerning 
mineral development and finance all but disminished. The Israeli offers to
assist the Jordanians were ignored and construction of the plant began in 
1976. By 1977, it was producing a million tons of potash each year. Still. 
Israel's similar Dead Sea Works on the western shore, was producing three
times as much potash demonstrating the costs of the two neighbors’ 
inability to agree on a joint understanding to exploit their mutually held 
natural resources (Melman, 182).
During the decade, Israel and Jordan not only worked out commercial 
arrangements but also cooperated on ecological matters as well. This was 
evidenced in the agreement to maintain the cleanliness of the shared waters 
of the Gulf of Eilat-Aqaba. The understanding consisted of a mutual
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pledge to inform the other nation's officials immediately in the event of a 
oil spill at either of the ports' the loading facilities. The agreement was 
utilized several times when Israeli authorities alerted the Jordanians that an
oil slick was headed toward Aqaba beach (Melman, 135).
In sum, negotiations related to economics, natural resources and 
ecological matters were secondary issues, often overshadowed during high 
level discussions between Amman and Jerusalem. They were very 
significant however, because they were concrete symbols of the tacit 
alliance. Though seemly mundane, they were significant because often they 
involved a regular pattern of discussion which in the opinion of Melman 
and Raviv are "the stuff of peaceful coexistence in the Middle East-even 
without a formal peace treaty" (185). Also, the secret contacts over these 
issues were important because without prompt resolution of such mundane 
problems, hostility or violence could arise seriously jeopardizing any hopes
for a permanent peace agreement between Israel and Jordan. Therefore, 
the case of the Jordanian-lsraeli tacit alliance during the decade from 1967
to 1977 was not one where the road to peace and normal diplomatic 
relations was paved first with economic cooperation. Rather than an 
agreement in one subject matter translating to an agreement on another 
issue, the covert partnership was characterized by efforts to cooperate
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wherever possible without making strides in related or unrelated fields, in 
fact, throughout the history of the tacit alliance, Israel and Jordan have not 
forced the often successful handling of economic matters to be translated 
into a comprehensive statement ending the official state of war.
Risks of the Tacit Alliance
Both parties incurred tremendous risks as a result of the clandestine 
exchanges across Jordan. However, the Israeli government and the 
Hashemite throne both perceived that even with these potential costs, the 
benefits obtained by the tacit alliance far outweighed even the risk of death 
of one of the partners. For the Israeli, especially the Labor party who had 
usually supported the Jordanian option equivocally, the domestic costs were 
paramount. The labor leaders were well aware of the liability of their 
negotiations with their eastern neighbor. They could publicly brandish a 
being "soft" on the Arabs by the Likud or other right-wing parties. Also, 
the possible political cost for a land swap for peace with Jordan could cost 
a leader or party any future hope of leading the Israeli government. 
Because of personal and party risks, the Israeli government paid particular 
attention to keeping the knowledge of their friendly contacts between their 
most trusted friends, namely the United States and Britain.
Also, the Israeli policymakers realized that any revelation of the 
clandestine discussions to a world audience might jeopardize their security 
belt on their eastern border. Israel worried about a leak which would
result in a Arab reaction, toppling the Hashemite dynasty and leading to the 
establishment of a radical and belligerent regime in Amman.
The king was confronted with the ultimate risk in meeting with the 
Israeli officials, his life. Moshe Zak states that a myth spread throughout 
the Middle East that any Arab ruler conducting negotiations with the
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Jewish state would be killed, such as the case with Hussein's grandfather
Abdullah and later Egyptian President Sadat, has nurtured the Jordanian 
monarch's insistence of tight security and secrecy (168).
Realistic death threats from their Arab brethren has been a major
problem for the Hashemites in publicly resolving their differences with the 
state of Israel ever since King Abdullah. In Statecraft in the Park: Israel s 
Practice of Quiet Diplomacy. Klieman identifies three concentric circles of 
opposition forces which have constantly confronted the Hashemite throne in
its efforts to publicly resolving their differences with the Jewish state: 
internal opposition from the monarch's own advisors and ministers and 
external pressures stemming from rival Arab ruler and from Palestinian
nationalists (2. 97).
Melman and Raviv as well as Klieman concur that the assassination of
King Abdullah, witnessed by the young prince, had a tremendous impact on 
Hussein that has lasted to present: "His death would serve a warning and a 
powerful deterrent for years to...his own grandson and successor on the 
Hashemite throne, King Hussein" (Klieman 2,97). According to Melman 
and Raviv, Hussein's fears, confirmed by uncountable threats and numerous 
assassination attempts, kept to a minimum the number of associates who 
were privy to the king's secret encounters with the Israelis (156).
It appears that Hussein harbors a special concern regarding the 
Syrians over his contacts with Jerusalem. Lustick confirms this notion by
asserting that if Jordan or Israel were to publicly confirm their veiled 
collaboration, Amman would be exposed to Syrian intrigues and 
intervention. Lustick explains that this concern stems from the Hashemites' 
realization that the Syrians are empowered to employ serious political and 
commercial reactions to punish any separate dialogue with the Jewish state.
For example, Syria has the power to close its airspace to Jordan and halt all 
traffic between Amman and Baghdad which would be very costly to 
Jordan. Also, during this period Crown Price Hassan strove to establish 
Amman as a financial, corporate and tourist center. Lustick notes that any 
such strained relations with its northern neighbor would have had 
disastrous effects, cancelling the Hashemite plan for the development of its 
capital (14).
Furthermore, the Jordanian acknowledgement of its alliance would 
probably have a negative impact on its relations with its Arab neighbors; if 
Jordanian-Isracli covert ties might lead to a separate permanent peace 
settlement, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia would likely suspend the substantial 
subsidies on which Amman relies. According to figures provided by 
(Loren Jekins in "Jordan Drops Funding for West Bank," the Kuwaiti and 
Saudis have provided these subsidies, which in the years of 1974-1976 
amounted to $386 million to Jordan as a "confrontation state," The 
Jordanian government relies heavily on these funds to provide for basic 
services; the monies accounted for 22 percent of Jordanian public 
expenditures during the two years of 1974-1976. Lustick stated that the 
Hashemite dependence grew in 1977 to nearly 40 percent of all government 
expenditures were financed by foreign, mostly Arab subsidies (15).
Israel for its part, has assisted Jordan in maintaining the deception 
through some extraordinary measures such as the selection of meeting sites 
and limiting the number of Israeli officials who have access to knowledge 
of the covert contacts. Moshe Dayan illustrated the working tacit 
cooperation which existed during this decade. During one of the early 
secret meeting after the reestablishment of ties across the Jordan in the late 
1960's, Jordanian Defense Minister Colonel al-Tal requested Dayan's 
intervention with tint editors of the Israeli press asking them to attack al-
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Tal for his stubborn hostility to Israel. Al-Tal had made this seemingly 
strange request to preserve his reputation at home and within the Arab 
community (136).
Given the potential consequences the Hashemites could face as a result 
of its covert alliance with Israel, the minimalist view gained influence in 
the early part of the 1970's. Finally, upon the May 1977 election of the 
Likud bloc's leader Menachem Begin, the minimalists position overcame 
the maximalist stance to be dominant policy in Amman. These two internal
changes within each of the neighboring stales had a profound impact upon 
the relationship across the Jordan. The carefully crafted understandings of 
the 1967-1977 period was left to erode into neglect as the two countries 
pursued an independent policy of disengagement.
1977-1984: The Era of Diminished Cooperation Across the Jordan 
The election victory of May 1977 saw the first non-Labor 
government in Israel's 29 year history. The installation of Menachem 
Begin to power brought a change in attitude toward the Jordanian role in 
the Middle East. The traditional Labor-led strategy of the Jordanian 
Option almost disappeared from late 1977 until 1984. During this period, 
there were few contacts between the governments of Israel and Jordan.
The change in perspective on both banks of the Jordan allowed the long­
standing working framework for communications to wither and nearly die. 
One of the few aspects from the 1967-1977 period which carried over after
the Likud victory was the exchange of intelligence information. Melnian 
and Raviv write than even this vital mode of cooperation was carried out to 
a much more limited degree (143).
Minimalist Preeminence in Jordan
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The change in character in the relationship across the Jordan could be
attributed to a shift in power away from the maximalist position to the
minimalist stance. Lustick states that in the wake of the Jordanian civil war
of 1970-1971, a powerful circle emerged within the royal court which
favored a more realistic outlook of Jordan's role in Middle Bastem affairs.
As noted before, this group strongly advocated a substantial reduction of 
Hashemite ambition. This faction, led by Crown Prince Hassan and 
included such influential supporters as Hassan's uncle Sharif Nasser, Queen 
Mother Zein and leading army officers and security officials, welcomed the 
1974 Rabat Arab Summit’s declaration relieving Jordan of responsibility 
for representing the Palestinians on the West Bank (6). Me I man and Raviv 
note however, tl at many like Prime Minister Zeid al-Rifai were close to 
the minimalist position but they viewed themselves more as pragmatists 
rather than "slaves to ideology" ( 154).
The Crown Prince was quoted in "The Dilemma of the l lashemites" 
published in the Spring 1974 edition of the Journal of Palestine Studies 
clearly outlining the minimalist opposition to the Hashemite's persistent 
claim to represent the Palestinians and its long-term desire to recapture the 
Holy City of Jerusalem and the West Bank. Hassan argued that this policy 
will "sooner or later, [lead] to the throne collapsing either under a 
Palestinian-Jordanian nationalist attack, or within the framework of a new 
map for the urea in which Arab and international factors will play a 
fundamental role." The only possible strategy to avoid this disastrous fate, 
advocates Crown Prince Hassan is to "disengage" from the Palestinians 
(164).
Klieman states that Hassan's statement acknowledged that the finality 
of the 1967 occupation of the West Bank and Rabat decision. Hassan
Mrealized that they effectively denied Jordan possible control or legitimacy 
to speak for the Palestinians (1, 17). Melman and Raviv assert that the 
minimalists based their stance on the geopolitical reality which confronted 
the Hashemite Kingdom. These factors included Jordan's relative inability 
to ever regain control of the West Bank. Also, Jordan was compromised 
by the fact that the majority of its two million people were Palestinians 
who aspirations for a Palestinian state could not be forever denied (154).
Therefore, the reevaluation of Jordan's policy objectives no longer
included cooperating with Israel to establish the foothold west of the Jordan 
River that was hoped to be expanded to include all of the West Bank. The 
minimalists no longer believed that the Isracli-Jordanian collaboration 
which administered the West Bank was advantageous to Jordan. Rather, 
the Hashemite Kingdom must attempt to disassociate itself with its western 
neighbor over this matter and instead, concentrate all its energies into the 
development of the Hashemite Kingdom on the Bast Bunk only.
The minimalists, according to Lustick, argued that from an 
economical and political standpoint, the West Bank was better off without 
the Bust Bunk than with it (11). Politically it would appear that such an 
argument is sound because not until recently, the only expression of 
discontent to erupt in the kingdom was a brief and minor incident 
involving army grievances over pay and command appointments.
Otherwise, since the loss of the West Bank and the forced Palestinian
migration, Jordan has experienced almost no internal unrest since the 
spring of 1971.
Also, it would appear that economically the Jordanian state has fared 
better since the loss of the West Bank. Figures from the Central Bank of 
Amman show that the Jordanian economy has flourished since 1967. The
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impressive pace of economic development was spawned by massive loans 
provided by the wealthy Arab oil states of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. 
Lustick notes that Jordan was considered "an international basketcase"
before 1967. However, Lustick further asserts that with a disciplined and 
effective economic development plan for the East Bank, the kingdom was
able to show some impressive signs of recovery. Figures from the Central 
Bank of Amman and confirmed by the Economic Intelligence Unit's 
statistics proved that Jordan's gross national product grew at a average rate 
of seven percent from 1967 to 1976. Later, Jordan’s GNP doubled in the 
years between 1978 and 1981 to reach five billion. A study done by 
Kannavsky of the East Bank economy published in 1976 concluded that
barring no major internal of regional upheavals, the East Bank's prospects 
appear to be favorably high for rates of growth of investments, production 
exports and higher standards of living. Lastly, inflation remained 
extremely low with the Jordanian dinar holding its value against the dollar 
(121, 128). This evidence adds further credibility to the minimalist 
argument that the Hashemites should give up all claims and hope for the
It would appear that such economic evidence during 1977-1984 
convinced King Hussein to accept the reality of the Rabat Summit decision 
and to concentrate on developing the remaining kingdom situated on the 
East Bank. Therefore this group, which began to include the king.
perceived the Hashemites' interests as best achieved through a 
disengagement from the thankless, unprofitable and ultimately self- 
destructive championing of the Palestinian cause. They sought to instead 
focus their energies on the objectives of strengthening the East Bank 
politically, militarily and economically in part by replacing Beirut as a
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center of Arab and international finance and investment. Melman and
Raviv state that after Lebanon became a "living hell" in the civil war of 
1975-1976 and subsequent violent repercussions, the Hashemite was 
partially successful in taking over Beirut's role a regional financial center 
(155). Later, Jordan's economy improved as a result of the Iran-lraq as 
foreign investors perceived the Hashemite Kingdom as a rock of stability in 
the region, funnelling large sums of capital into the country, particularly 
into Amman. As a result of this prosperity, political dissidencc was 
calmed. Conveniently for Hussein's regime, the capital which in the decade 
following the Six Day Was swelled from 250,000 to over one million, was
the chief beneficiary of the economic upswing (Melman, 156).
Hassan's supporters also believed that an agreement with Israel over 
the West Bank would have major repercussions on Jordan's economic 
relations with its Arab neighbors. As noted above, Jordan became 
particularly reliant of Arab monies given to it as a confrontation state. If 
such the scope of the alliance became public Knowledge, the Arab states 
would probably cut all needed capital funds, destroying any Hashemite 
hopes to improve and modernize the economy. Jordan would become an 
pariah in the Arab world, similar to the situation faced by Egypt, causing 
the investments to be pulled from Amman. The result of which would 
destroy Hassan's hopes to make the Jordanian capital the Middle East's 
financial center.
Hassan who was in charge of economic development in Jordan, 
viewed the increased territory on the West bank of the Jordan River would 
threaten the dramatic economic gains achieved following the loss of these 
lands. The prince, according to Lustick, hoped to continue to broaden the 
financial foundations of Jordan, but realized that the economy and its
growth were entirely dependent on the East Bank's political stability which 
would be jeopardized by the inclusion of the West Bank: "Even if the 
Hashemites resolved their internal differences and united behind a 
territorial compromise, the added weight of hundreds of thousands of 
bitter Palestinians would be a heavy and perhaps unbearable political 
burden for the kingdom" (16).
The future of the Middle Eastern economy might undermine the 
Hashemite rule of a united kingdom spanning the Jordan. Jordan which has 
few exports besides potash mined from the Dead Sea, relies heavily on 
remittances sent home from Jordanian citizens who went aboard to find 
employment. The minimalists realized that the present boom in the oil 
industry could not continue indefinitely. Once the oil-based economies of 
the Arabian Gulf slowed, many would expel foreign workers. The 
Jordanians who were once sending paychecks from the gulf would return 
to an economy which could not absorb them, therefore becoming an 
unemployed underclass in cities like Amman (Melman. 154-155). After 
experiencing substantial improvements in living standards through foreign 
employment, these unemployed multitude could become a dissatisfied and 
unruly force capable of causing serious harm to the Hashemite throne.
Another reason why Crown Prince Hassan and his supporters did not 
see the West Bank as an asset to be regained, but as a heavy weight which 
the kingdom could happily live without, was their calculation that if the 
West Bank could somehow be repossessed, it would be ungovernable.
They cited that the old established families of the West Bank who were the 
Hashemite's chief supporters were rapidly losing influence to the PLO. 
Hassan told the king that the problem would worsen as the younger
generations believed more in the PLO than in the Jordanian authorities 
(Melman, 154).
In addition, the minimalists explained to the king that with the PLO 
influence widespread on the West Bank and the deep enmity toward the 
Hashemites still ingrained in the Palestinians, the repossession of the land 
including these iridescent factors, would ultimately pose a real threat from 
within the nation (Lustick, 17). The minimalist state the inclusion of the 
West Bank back into Jordan would ruin the delicate demographic balance 
maintained in the Bast Bank since 1967. Thus, already a binational state. 
Jordan would become more a Palestinian state, whose people did not share 
the loyalty to the Hashemite throne, especially in light of the king's violent 
September 1970 actions. In addition, according to population projections, 
the demographic factor threatened to worsen as the Palestinian proportion 
of the East Bank was to rise above sixty percent. Amman's projected 
Palestinian component was to total close to eighty percent (Lustirk, 16).
Lustick points out that the East Bulk Palestinian majority is held in c
Not only would the compromise threaten Jordan's economy, military 
am) social structure, Lustick notes that it could also cause sharp divisions 
within the Hashemite regime. He states that Hassan's success in developing 
the Jordanian economy would be cancelled by such arrangement, likely 
causing intense resentment. Therefore, Lustick believes that the 
differences between the king and his brother and between Palestinian and 
Jordanian social elites of the relationship among the Palestinians and 
Hashemites which were conveniently muted by the Israeli occupation, 
would quickly rise to the surface following the negotiation of such a 
settlement (15-16). The ensuing power struggle within the royal court and
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within Jordan's elites would likely result in weakening the Hashemite 
regime.
Likud's Dismissal of the Jordanian Option
The Israeli policy during the the Likud government was based upon 
the estimation that Israeli objectives could not be substantially improved 
upon through negotiation with Jordan, especially on talks regarding 
territorial compromise. Since 1967, it became apparent that Israeli 
energies were directed toward asserting the territorial demands drawn 
front the traditional Jewish religious, historical and security claims to Judea 
and Samaria as integral parts of the "Land of Israel." Lustick states that 
Begin held the belief that the Jewish nation had a historical right to all of 
Palestine. The complete satisfaction of Zionist ideological claims to the 
Land of Israel requires that the West Bank and other occupied territories 
be incorporated into Israel proper. Lustick further notes that these 
historical claims revert to the fact that Judea and Samaria formed the heart 
of the ancient kingdoms of David and Solomon. In addition, those who 
wish to see these areas included in the Jewish state point out another 
religious-historical fact that the "Tomb of the Patriarches" where 
Abraham, Isaac and Jacob were supposed to be buried in Hebron (17).
These beliefs appear to have had a significant impact in the formation 
of Israeli policy. Ian Lustick states that from the left-wing Mapam to the 
right-wing Herat, nearly all of die major Israeli political parties support 
Knesset resolutions proclaiming the superiority of Jewish rights in 
occupied territories over any historical claims asserted by any other nation. 
Rather than debating existence of Jewish rights in these lands to build 
settlements and purchase land, discussion has centered around the manner 
Ip which these rights should be exercised at the particular time (17).
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Statements by the Likud government indicate that the occupation 
enables Israel to implement its historical mission to settle the Jews 
throughout the land of Israel. In fact. Melman and Raviv state that the 
Likud wasted no time to work for this goal; a few days after winning the 
May 1977 election, Begin visited the West Bank settlements of Lion Moreh. 
While there, the new prime minister promised that there would be many 
more Elon Morehs" (qt. in Melman, 143).
The statement was echoed throughout the new government, in 
particular, from the Agricultural Minister Ariel Sharon, who spoke of 
"establishing facts on the ground" so that Israel would never have to leave 
the West Bank. The importance of this statement became apparent during 
the seven years of Begin's premiership when under Sharon's authority, 
more than one hundred new settlements were erected in the occupied 
territories.
Ihe rapid settlement following the Likud victory saw approximately 
35.000 Jews settle in the West Bank and the Oaza Strip. Most of these 
settlements are concentrated in a ring of n xlem apartments complexes, 
surrounding East Jerusalem which stretch from Ramot and Neve Yaacov in 
the north through French Hill and East Taipku to Gilo in the south on die 
outskirts of Bethlehem. The location of these settlements in the West Bank 
and Gaza reflects the overriding security concerns of the Jewish state. The 
vast majority of the settlements were began as paramilitary encampments 
which were eventually transformed into civilian towns. For example, the 
town of Kiryat Araba was built on hills overlooking Hebron and Kadum in 
in the Damarian hills not far from Nablus; both began as groups of 
civilians living within the confines of army camps (Lustick, 25).
Not only does the location of the Jewish settlements reflect the goals 
of the Likud's position, land confiscated which has been consistently placed 
into the hand of Jewish settlers for security purposes. Lustick closely links 
the confiscation of land and the establishment of the settlements in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip, to the campaign by the Israeli government the Jewish 
National Fund, the arm of the World Zionist Organization responsible for 
land acquistion and development. He states that the purpose of these 
purchases is to gain as much land as possible in the occupied territories 
under Jewish control. This policy has been relatively successful as secret
and semi-secert land purchases made by undisclosed companies fronting for 
the Jewish National Fund have resulted in the transfer of large tracts of 
land throughout the West Bank. Lustick estimates that up to eighty percent 
of land in the Jordan Valley north of Jericho was transferred to Israeli 
hands (26-27). It would appear that the occupation and the Likud's 
consent, provided these institutions with extraordinary opportunities for 
large Kate land purchases and expropriation. Therefore, even if the 
occupied territories are not openly claimed by the state of Israel their 
control and ownership were to place them in the Land of Israel.
Instead of a cooperative administration which was negotiated during 
the 1967-1977 period where Israel would control the occupied territories' 
security and the Hashemites would govern the daily lives of the Palestinian 
residents, die new Likud leadership advocated annexation of the lands into 
the Jewish state. These politicians believed that they no longer needed 
Jordanian assistance to control the Palestinian population. They further felt 
that the established presence of an Arab state undermined Israeli control, 
creating a severe security risk. Given this posture, Jerusalem no longer 
neededlhe secret exchanges across die Jordan to fulfill its new objectives.
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Rather, the Israeli policy makers perceived that the tacit alliance proved to 
be a potential hindrance in accomplishing its annexation plans.
Annexation, was claimed by the Likud faction as tempting from a 
military point of view. The Jordan River was declared to be Israel’s 
"permanent security frontier" while the Gaza Strip was an "inseparable 
part of Israel" for security reasons (Horowitz, 37). Horowitz points out 
that the Jordan River is not an impressive body of water but is a 
satisfactory tank trap and the hills in the Jordan Valley, providing an
excellent second line of defense against attacks from over the river (36).
In addition, annexation would ensure that radar stations places atop the hills 
of Samaria would give the nation an excellent early warning system from 
Jordanian, Syrian and Iraqi air attacks (Lustick, 17-18).
Another military advantage gained by the annexation was painfully 
proven during the sustained accurate bombardment from the Arab section 
of Jerusalem during the 1948 and l% 7 wars. Lustick points out that 
during the 1967 war, the heart of Tel Aviv was only twenty miles of 
Jordanian artillery and tanks while the Knesset was well within the range of 
mortar tire (19). The annexation of the West bank would eliminate these 
potential liabilities during times of war.
These new perceptions and objectives were reflected during the 
negotiations that followed the May 1977 elections. These talks were held 
under the direction of Moshe Dayan. As noted earlier, Dayan did not 
believe that Hussein would ever sign a peace treaty without the impossible 
condition that all the captured lands be returned to Jordan. Moshe Dayan 
was joined in his disbelief of the Jordanian Option by Prime Minister 
Begin. Both questioned the logic of the talks aimed at reaching a 
permanent settlement which must include such harsh demands. They felt
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that given Judea and Samaria were justly part of Israel, why then negotiate 
their future with Jordan (Melman, 139).
Melman and Raviv state that the two leaders saw some benefits 
continuing the negotiations. According to the two historians, Dayan and 
Begin hoped for a diplomatic breakthrough to start the Likud 
administration on a positive note. Therefore, they were willing to explore 
to a very limited extent, the Jordanian option to see for themselves where 
the road through Amman might lead (139-140).
In London on August 22 and 23, 1977, Dayan met with the Jordanian 
to assess the possibility of obtaining a settlement on Israeli terms. Moshe 
Zak notes that the meeting were fruitless and confirmed Dayan's original 
estimation that Hussein would not consider any permanent settlement 
without regaining every inch of the territory he had lost in 1967 (173). 
The king had insisted that he could not possibly recommend that a single 
Arab village become formally part of the Jewish state. Hussein vigorously 
asserted that a territorial compromise would be seen as treachery within 
the Arab world. He would be accused of betraying the Palestinians, giving 
land to the Jews for the sake of expanding his own kingdom (Melman.
140) . Dayan states in Breakthrough, that the king also rejected a possible 
partition of the West Bank between the two neighbors, due to a genuine 
obligation to help the Palestinians. However, the king noted that since the 
Rabat conference stripped him of his authority to take any initiative on 
their behalf (34). Having meeting with the Jordanian monarch, Dayan 
returned to Jerusalem and told Prime Minister Begin probably what he 
wanted to hear: that there was nothing to discuss with the king (Melman.
141) .
Throughout Hussein's long reign, he had always worried over being 
isolated while other actors negotiated the fate of the We»t Bank and the 
future of his throne. During this period Hussein had his reasons fear that 
such concerns would come to fruition as the Israelis no longer rested their
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foreign policy on the Jordanian Option but instead, looked toward Egypt 
for a peace settlement. Kiieman asserts that in the latter half of 1977, 
Dayan had persuaded Jerusalem to shift its diplomatic efforts to Egypt ( I. 
101). The tacit alliance was no longer viewed with the same importance 
that it had garnished in the past; Dayan's encounter with Hussein was the
last known direct, top level contact until 1984.
Kiieman states that although such high level negotiations no longer 
continued, the flow of indirect communication continued, abet at much
decreased volume. He cites the Camp David Accord, where in Hu 'spin's 
absence, no less than fourteen references to Jordan appear, "reflecting 
Israel's implicit respect for the interests of the Hashemite Kingdom, its 
special status and future role in either power-sharing or peacemaking" (1. 
107). Yet it also serves to demonstrate the Israeli ideological and political 
ambivalence toward Jordan during the Likud era, ranging from a studied 
indifference to a special sensitivity to the reality of the overall Israeli - 
Jordanian indifference.
Risks of the Benign Neglect
Like the positions carried by the two parties in the previous period of 
tacit cooperation following the Six Day War, the benign neglect of the 
collaboration also imposed risks on Israel and Jordan. For the Hashemite 
regime, time appared to be running out to regain the lost lands. Under 
the Likud government, accelerated construction of the settlements in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip made it clear that its neighbor was making plans
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for a permanent stay. In light of this the minimalists prefer to make 
demands which could be realistically won. Therefore, in the beginning of 
the Begin era, the Likud position seemed complementary with the 
minimalists in Amman who did not want the West Bank. Later, according 
to Melman and Raviv, the Jordanian of both factions came to realize that
the Likud actions were not entirely beneficial to Jordanian interests. They 
state that after Begin became prime minister, the taking of Arab-owned and 
"empty lands" in the West Bank and the subsequent resettlement a record
number of Jewish citizens in those lands where perceived in Amman as a 
gradual annexation of the occupied territories which worsened :he living
conditions of the Palestinians (153-157).
Jordanian authorities became increasing concerned by the more 
frequent and vocal statements of the Likud government, calling on the 
transfer or expulsion of a large number of Palestinian Arab from the West 
Bank. Rabbi Mcir Kahane, of the extreme right-wing Kach party, openly 
called for the mass expulsion to separate permanently, the Arabs from the 
Jews. Others in Israeli politics voiced the possibility of persuading the 
Palestinians to leave even by offering financial incentives to those Arabs 
who move ("Expelling").
Melman and Raviv note that a paradox developed in that the 
minimalists believed that they needed the Likud to become the leading 
force in Jordanian politics yet, the more they realized that the Likud's 
policy could destroy the remaining Hashemite kingdom. The minimalists 
where willing to give up the West Bank in exchange for order and 
economic development on the East Bank. However, the Likud's policy of
keeping the West Bank would entail the expulsion of hundreds of thousands
of angry Palestinians who would angrily take residence on the East Bank.
With this massive migration, all hopes for peace would vanish as the 
political scene wold once again destabilize. The influx would also increase 
the Palestinian majority in Jordanian bringing to question the Hashemite's 
ability to govern a population that largely holds it in contempt (157).
As time went on Hussein and his closest aides understood that the 
chances of recovering the West Bank and East Jerusalem were diminishing 
with each passing week that saw more and more settlements established 
and the Israeli authorities consolidating their power with the settlements on 
the West Bank. It appears that the Hashemites concluded that if they gave 
up on their continuing demands for the return of the West Bank, they 
would eventually lose the East Bank.
While certain Israeli interests during 1977*1984 could be served by 
the annexation of the West Bank through a dissmissal of the Iordan Oprtion 
and the subsequent neglect of the tacit alliance, others Isreali goals could 
only be achieved through Israeli withdrawal from the occupied lands. One 
of the most significant concerns that arose with the continued occupation 
and possible annexation was that the country 's demographic compost ton 
would be jeapordized. In a New York Times article entitled "A Forecast 
for Israel: More Arabs than Jews," Thomas Friedman maintains that 
Zionism was rooted in the strong desire by Jews to end their "abnormal" 
form of national existence as minority in all countries and a majority in 
none. The Zionist goal was to be achieved by contrating enough Jews in 
one place, Palestine, where the Jewish nation would become a clear, 
unassailable majority. As a result of the 1948 exodus of some 750,000 
Arabs and subsequent migrations during Israel's early years of statehood, 
the Zionist nation was able to create a substantial Jewish majority.
However, according to lan Lustick, a demographic problem arose
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concerning the large Arab population residing in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip. Lustick notes that the "demographic problem" worried all Jewish 
politicial parties in this period and continues to concern them today (17). 
Friedman notes that if the Jewish state annexed the occupied territories the 
Jewish majority would be seriously threatened. High birth rates of Arabs 
in these lands acerbate this problem. To illustrate his point, Friedman 
explains that there are fifty thousand Jewish babies bom every year 
compared to some sixty thousand Arab babies. At that rate, there will be 
4.1 million Jews and 1.2 million Jews in Israel proper by the year 2000. If 
these totals for non-Jews are added to those 1.9 million Arabs living in the 
Gaza Strip and West Bank, the Arab population in the annexed lands would 
almost equal the Jewish total. Friedman quotes Ron Casio, a writer for 
the Hebrew daily Ha'arets: "Jews will become the minority in Greater 
Israel. Then there will only two possibilities: Israel will become like South 
Africa in which the Jewish minority will rule over an Arab minority 
denying its civil and political rights, or the state of Israel will become a 
Palestinian state." Casio advocates a withdrawal from the occupation and 
vehemently abhores any idea of possible annexation because he asserts that 
the only way to prevent the inevitable Arab majority in the Jewish state is 
for Israel to give up heavily Arab-populated territories: He further states 
that in only this manner can Israel remain what it was established over four 
decades ago: a democratic Jewish state.
Conclusioo
The Jordanian-lsraeli tacit alliance can be best characterized as the 
outward extension of the two nations' foreign and domestic goals. When 
the leaders of the two states perceived the cooperation to be in their best 
interests, they were willing to assume the risks that the collaboration
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intails. 'Phis situation was evidenced in the period of 1967-1977. lamer 
from 1977 to 1984, upon internal changes which occured in both capitals, 
created an atmosphere where the tacit alliance was no longer perceived as 
essential to the two nations' needs, in fact, the collaboration was viewed as 
possing a threat to achieving the neighbors’ respective policy goals.
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